From: Subject: Biological Weapons Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2010 16:10:13 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01CA9D0F.B5E626B0" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CA9D0F.B5E626B0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: file://F:\Lanset_Website_18Jan10\Articles\Biological weapons.htm Biological Weapons

3D"HM00285_.wmfASG Magazine/ Biological Weapons

Defense Against the=20 Poor  Man's   Nuclear Bomb:

A = 3-part exploration=20 of the modern biological threat

........................................................by Christopher T. = Carey

[This is the first of a three part examination of the contemporary=20 biological/toxin weapons threat which faces the world on the eve of the = new=20 millennium; it is written with especial purpose and particular emphasis = on=20 helping educate and prepare the average individual to understand, = prepare for,=20 and protect against a `worst-case' biological threat of the highest = magnitude,=20 should it ever materialize.]

+++++++++++++++++++++

Part One: The nature of the=20 problem

 

The Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC). In April of this year the = final=20 deadline for ratification of the world-wide Chemical Weapons Convention = (CWC)=20 fell due; despite much contentious argument by the USA, Russia and China = over=20 provisions and ramifications, last minute negotiations between the major = hold-outs were successful and the CWC was put into general effect.

Official US hesitation to endorse the treaty was (and is) based upon=20 criticisms that the convention is too weakly written, has too many = loopholes,=20 legal discrepancies, and numerous ineffectual enforcement mechanisms, = thereby=20 rendering it inadequate for the purpose of controlling the development,=20 maintenance, and proliferation of chemical weapons. Proponents argued = that even=20 a less-than-ideal treaty for chemical weapons control is better than = none at=20 all. The issue, as might be imagined, was a highly controversial one in = which=20 much emotional and intellectual argument is still being exchanged.

While the world debates the important issue of how to eliminate = chemical=20 weapons of mass destruction, a fact that is frequently overlooked is = that the=20 Chemical Weapons Convention is limited exclusively to only one half of = the=20 two-fold threat posed by chemical and biological weapons technology of = the next=20 decade. Solely dedicated to elimination of chemical weapons among the = nations of=20 the world, the CWC does not address itself in any respect to the far = more=20 ominous hazard presenting itself as the world prepares to enter the 21st = Century: the specter of regional use of biological agents for political=20 ends.

The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). Chemical = agents have=20 frequently been referred to as "the poor man's weapon," an allusion to = the fact=20 that the formulation, production and deployment costs of chemical = weapons are=20 far less than for the highly sophisticated weapons technology systems = favored by=20 the world's superpowers. Assuming the accuracy of this surmise, it may = be=20 further suggested that biological agents might therefore be logically = considered=20 the "poor man's nuclear bomb," since gram for gram the lethal potential = of=20 biologicals vastly exceeds (to the extent of several orders of = magnitude) that=20 of chemical agents. And while the world appears resolved to control the = use of=20 chemical weapons in warfare, the same dedicated resolve is not yet being = brought=20 to bear on the matter of biologicals--despite world-wide awareness of = the=20 potentially monumental problems biologicals pose as we near the end of = the=20 century.

At present, tentative initial efforts are being made to formulate a=20 satisfactory treaty instrument for a proposed Biological and Toxic = Weapons=20 Convention (BTWC), although the issues facing proponents of a world-wide = moratorium on biologicals promise to be even more enormously complex and = controversial than those implicit in the CWC. Using the hesitant, = uncertain=20 progress of the CWC as a measuring stick, it is safe to say that a = considerable=20 length of time is likely to pass before anything resembling an adequate = and=20 widely acceptable proposal for control of biological weapons is ready = for=20 ratification by the nations of the world. That, of course, leaves us = faced by=20 weapons whose potential theoretically far surpasses any horrors thus far = experienced from the use of chemical weapons of war: the prospect for = social=20 chaos, death and destruction which the use of biological agents might = unleash=20 upon a largely unprepared world is almost beyond imagination. The = possession of=20 these weapons by belligerent nations is bad enough, but the real = nightmare is=20 the thought of biologicals used tactically by terrorists and political=20 partisans.

Biologicals: an ancient weapon of convenience. Contrary to what = one might=20 think, the use of biological agents in warfare is not a modern = phenomenon.=20 Historical documents reveal that bacteria, viruses and fungi have been = used as=20 weapons to achieve political and military purposes--both deliberately = and=20 unwittingly--consistently throughout the past 2000 years. Reports of = regional=20 conflicts or tribal wars in which the enemy's common water supply was=20 deliberately contaminated are almost as old as humanity itself, and in = several=20 incidents recorded during the Middle Ages historical accounts describe = offensive=20 actions in which defenders catapulted their dead casualties and diseased = corpses=20 over besieged castle walls into the midst of the enemy. From both a = biological=20 and psychological standpoint, the effect on the attackers is easily=20 imagined.

Even in relatively recent times, biological agents appear to have = figured=20 substantially in American history. In the late 1800s, for instance, = blankets=20 contaminated by the smallpox virus (which normally claims 1 to 30=B0/a = mortality,=20 even in heterogeneous populations sharing normal antibodies) came near = to=20 eliminating whole tribes of American Indians after being distributed by = the US=20 Indian Agency, apparently with deliberate intent. There are many other=20 documented instances of this sort (involving use of smallpox to spread = contagion=20 among indigenous populations) on record throughout the world. Aside from = these=20 simple attempts at suspected genocide, some well-known forms of = biologicals,=20 such as Yersinia pestis (popularly known as Plague, or the Black Death) = and=20 Small Pox, have appeared repeatedly over past centuries.

The First World War saw use of biologicals by Germany to infect = Romanian=20 cavalry horses with glanders. Japan's extensive biological research and = field=20 experimentation on the Manchurian Chinese during the Second World War, = is now=20 being more fully disclosed. Biologicals of the mycotoxin group (fungal = agent=20 T-2, among others) were purported to have been used in the mix of agents = (popularly referred to as Yellow Rain) against various Mid and East = Asian tribes=20 in areas under former Soviet control, throughout the 60s, 70s and = 80s.

Regardless of the fact that most of the research in biological = warfare has=20 continued under very tight security, our knowledge of biologicals--for = both war=20 and peaceful use--has progressed impressively over the past decades. = However,=20 despite this fact, some recent discoveries--most notably the Ebola virus = discovered in Africa--appear to be relatively new to Western = understanding and=20 pose the challenge of even more frightening possibilities for death and=20 debilitation. These recently isolated biological entities herald a new = level of=20 heightened concern over the possible use of their effects as a = weapon.

Emergence of an old threat in new form. Even as we presently = address the=20 recognized threat potential of chemical agents of war, the world-wide = community=20 of specialists in NBC research and protection technology perceives that = a far=20 more perfidious danger exists in the possible use of biological agents = by small,=20 non-national, partisan or sectarian terrorist groups to achieve = political aims.=20 Biological agents are, as has been mentioned, relatively simple to = culture,=20 produce and store. They are furthermore comparatively easy to hide, = stockpile,=20 and relocate rapidly to keep them from being discovered. Although = sophisticated,=20 costly laboratory facilities permit large scale preparation of = biologicals, even=20 basic low-tech equipment (including ordinary petri dishes, easily = obtained=20 common laboratory items, and hobby-grade `chemistry set' instruments) = may be=20 used to quickly produce lethal quantities of deadly BW agents.

The scenario of terrorist use of biologicals to create widespread = death and=20 social chaos for political purposes is currently being explored as a = laboratory=20 model by a number of international defense research groups investigating = the=20 possible emergence of biologicals in this form of use. Many feel that = far from=20 being merely possible, it is simply a matter of time before the first = disastrous=20 incident of this kind takes place in a densely populated urban setting. = Advanced=20 warning of the potential dangers posed by terrorist use of biological = agents was=20 given when it was found that members of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, = in=20 addition to manufacturing, storing, and using deadly Sarin nerve agent = (US=20 military designation: Agent GB), visited Africa in attempts to obtain = specimens=20 of the Ebola virus. The greater intent of their effort may only be = imagined at,=20 although this particular incident is merely one in a recent number of = similar=20 instances involving efforts made by socially or politically deviant = fringe=20 groups to develop (or obtain) biologicals for use as weapons. Further=20 underscoring of an unhesitating willingness to use such deadly weapons = on=20 innocent civilians was of course provided by the sensational Aum = Shinrikyo=20 instigated Sarin Tokyo subway attack of 1995.

The warning of Iraq's example. In addition to the lethal toxicity = of many=20 biologicals, another aspect of the danger they pose is the fact that = there are=20 currently no satisfactory systems capable of providing reliable early = warning or=20 even basic detection of biological agent use. Perfectly highlighting the = critical concerns over this particular aspect of the problem is the = example=20 provided by discovery of the extensive biological research programs = conducted by=20 Saddam Hussein's regime in the late 1980s. Although almost all of Iraq's = chemical and biological weapons research was found to have been = dedicated to=20 development of fatally toxic or incapacitating agents, the discovery of = select=20 Iraqi programs focusing upon use of biologicals to inflict subtle but = severe,=20 long term disablement (through exposure to relatively low concentrations = of=20 certain carcinogenic substances) was a completely unexpected = finding.

According to the United Nations Special Commission on Munitions = (UNSCOM),=20 Iraq exhaustively investigated the use of the mycotoxins (fungal toxins) = as=20 weapons--particularly a specific entity known as aflatoxin (a toxin = produced by=20 Aspergillus flavus). Initial studies on cultivation of aflatoxin for = possible=20 war use began in 1988 at the Al Sahnan facility in Iraq. Testing there = indicated=20 that exposure to high concentrations of this naturally occurring toxic = fungal=20 byproduct (most frequently found as a contaminant of grain or peanut = crops)=20 caused immediate death, while exposure to low concentrations of the = highly=20 carcinogenic toxin appeared to provoke development of progressive liver = cancer.=20 It also appeared frequently to stimulate a strange assortment of bizarre = physical symptoms, fitting no previously known disease profile. = Interestingly,=20 low concentration aflatoxin exposure was shown to initially produce only = mild,=20 negligible flu-like symptoms of brief duration (such as nasal = congestion,=20 sneezing, eye-watering, etc.), followed by no further evidence of = discernible=20 disease processes until the appearance of aggressively metastasizing = neoplasms=20 years later.

By 1990, Iraq had begun large-scale `weaponization' using aflatoxin;=20 eventually, more than 410 of Iraq's estimated 572 gallons of highly = concentrated=20 aflatoxin were loaded into munitions. In investigations conducted = subsequent to=20 the end of the 1991 Gulf War, UNSCOM investigations disclosed that Iraq=20 possessed (among a total inventory of stockpiled biological weapons = whose=20 numbers are still fully undetermined) some sixteen 8400 aerial bombs = filled with=20 aflatoxin and two Al Abbas (Iraqi SCUD-B extended range missile variant) = aflatoxin-loaded warheads at the onset of Gulf War hostilities. Although = UNSCOM=20 efforts continue to determine more precisely the full extent of the = Iraqi=20 biological agent research and production programs, factual retroactive=20 assessments were (and arc still) hindered by continuing Iraqi failure to = fully=20 disclose documentation and turn over complete data on their = unconventional BW=20 research program. Furthermore, current intelligence suggests that these = programs=20 covertly continue at the present time, despite post-war destruction of = Iraq's=20 munitions, close scrutiny of their former CBW research activities, and=20 subsequent careful Western monitoring of Iraq's remaining offensive=20 capabilities.

A question of exposure. Although there appears to be no actual = evidence=20 that any biologicals were ever deliberately deployed against Gulf War = troops,=20 one of the many important reasons for present intense concern over the = matter is=20 a recurring question of the possible link which biologicals might have = played in=20 creating the bizarre, atypical symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome. At the = time of the=20 Gulf War, as has already been mentioned, although marginal CW detection = systems=20 existed, none of the Allied Coalition Forces had functional biological = agent=20 detection and warning instrumentation. Post war revelation of incidents = such as=20 the February 1991 Iraqi missile air burst which sprayed US Navy Petty = Office 2nd=20 Class Nicholas Roberts (and others in his Alabama Naval Reserve Seabees = unit)=20 with an unidentified mist takes on a new and ominous relevance, seen in = the=20 light of these deficits and uncertainties. As is the case with a number = of other=20 Gulf War veterans, P02C Roberts is now suffering from cancer of the = lymph=20 system. His example of suspect BW exposure is not unusual, nor is his = experience=20 in the Gulf War unique.

Circumstances such as this, considered together with Iraq's = demonstrated=20 interest in the development of highly unconventional CBW agents, and the = existence of Libyan leader Moammar Khaddafi's continuing support of = clandestine=20 CBW programs, provide ample cause for concern that these deadly weapons = may have=20 already been used without Western knowledge on the Gulf War battlefield. = In the=20 context of these known facts associated with possession of biologicals = by well=20 funded national entities, the thought that BW agents might in future end = up in=20 the hands of small, elite, highly organised terrorist groups for use = against=20 innocent civilian populations is not that speculative a prospect.

Defense against biologicals. Excluding the impact of their = immense=20 psychological considerations, biological agents (along with chemical = agents) are=20 the only weapons of war against which completely effective immediate = defense is=20 available. This is not the case with 1000 pound conventional high = explosive=20 bombs, nor is it a characteristic of nuclear weapons, against both of = which=20 there is virtually no absolutely certain protection possible. = Fortunately, the=20 same protective measures and defensive strategies which provide safety = from=20 chemical agents will-in virtually all instances--provide a high measure = of=20 protection against biologicals. Individual and collective protection = equipment=20 (such as individual respirators and filters, sealed shelters and = collective=20 filtration systems) are all quite effective against the immediate = effects of an=20 attack by biological agents.

During the Gulf War of 1991, the United States was suddenly faced by = the=20 prospect of having to defend against both chemical and biological = weapons after=20 a full decade of failing to fully prepare, despite full knowledge of = Iraq's=20 unhesitating use of nerve and mustard agents during its war with Iran in = the mid=20 to late 80s, for the first real possibility of encountering CB weapons = since=20 1918. A moderate level of readiness was maintained by US forces prior to = 1991,=20 but American protective capability in NBC protection at the time of the = Gulf War=20 was dated and relied upon near-obsolescent equipment first entering = service back=20 to the early 60s. Long overdue for upgrading of basic NBC defensive = materiel,=20 training, and techniques, as well as needing overall enhancement of its=20 strategic and tactical NBC protection planning, the US was not as well = prepared=20 for CB war as were some of its NATO allies.

One result of the sudden realization of this inadequacy was that in = the haste=20 of preparing for the anticipated challenge, unproven and not fully = researched=20 protective concepts were perfunctorily grasped at and put into effect. = The use=20 of Pyridostigmine as a prophylactic nerve agent premedication for troops = is an=20 excellent example of one such hasty measure undertaken at the last = minute; post=20 Gulf War studies now show that the Pyridostigmine is not completely = without=20 substantially deleterious side effects in certain = individuals--especially with=20 relation to synergistic reactions with other substances.

Examples of the American failure to provide satisfactory NBC = protection such=20 as this and others like it, reflect extremely short-sighted US military = planning=20 in recent years for maintenance of the sort of high-level chemical and=20 biological defensive capability that might be properly expected of the = world's=20 most formidable military power.

The real problem. That the best possible protection must be = maintained to=20 provide adequate immediate defense against CB agents is inarguable. = There are,=20 however, other subtler considerations which demand an even higher level = of=20 concern: in addition to critical BW detection and warning concerns, the=20 post-attack consequences of the use of biologicals remain among the most = perplexing challenges facing us today. Further, unlike chemical agents = which=20 usually disperse relatively quickly, the delayed secondary and long term = (tertiary) outcomes of biological agent use are almost certain to be far = more=20 damaging than the initial effects, severe though they may be. Depending = upon the=20 agent in reference, everything in a given environment contaminated with = lethal=20 or lingering biologicals--principally water and food sources--may be = affected=20 for a period of time lasting from a few days to months, years, or even=20 decades.

For this reason, mere possession of physical defensive equipment = (individual=20 respirators, filters and sealed collective shelters) takes on a = considerably=20 reduced importance in the far greater, overall problem of coping with = the=20 long-term aftermath of biological attack. Furthermore, the inherent = difficulty=20 of protecting against the residual effects of B W adds increased urgency = to=20 international attempts to control their use and proliferation. = Unfortunately,=20 while the erstwhile `civilized' nations recognize the wisdom of an = international=20 BW treaty, terrorists (separatist and political or religiously motivated = extremist groups) are `outlaws' who do not come under the jurisdiction = of a=20 treaty such as the envisioned BTWC. It is not difficult to understand = the=20 compelling and complex challenge of attempting to end the threatened use = of=20 biological weapons by modern nations, through adoption of a formal = instrument of=20 international agreement; but given the simplicity with which biologicals = may be=20 produced and the costliness of defending against them, it is difficult = to=20 conceive of how adequate measures may be devised to keep biologicals = effectively=20 out of the hands of extremists. It is they who are far more likely to be = instigators of a BW attack than a recognized national entity, and = consequently=20 they pose a far more urgent threat needs to be effectively dealt = with.

Specifics of biological weaponry. In the next segment, Part = Two: Types=20 of BW agents, dispersal & transmission]we shall review the range = of=20 biological war agents currently recognized as constituting the greatest = danger=20 in the present decade.

 

 

Part Two: Types of BW agents, = dispersal=20 & transmission

 

Introduction to Biological Agents. Biological warfare is, seen = from one=20 perspective, the use of micro organisms, or their byproducts (toxins), = to=20 inflict injury and death on macro organisms. Traditionally, biological = micro=20 organisms used for warfare have fallen into three main categories: = viruses,=20 bacteria and fungi. Additionally, toxins, or hazardous byproducts of = micro=20 organisms, have been included in this group of substances capable of = being=20 utilized deliberately for warfare purposes. Although their central = importance in=20 warfare has been to kill or severely injure human beings, they may also = be used=20 effectively to destroy plant life and domestic animals, thus crippling a = nation's food supply and economy.

Among the oldest weapons of war--far older than chemical or nuclear=20 arms--biological agents are relatively simple to create and economical = to=20 produce. They are also easy to store, hide and move to prevent = discovery;=20 furthermore, only very small amounts can be used covertly to achieve = very=20 deadly, widespread effects, thus earning biological agents the cachet of = "poor=20 man's nuclear bomb." Consequently, BW lends itself particularly well to=20 terrorist and guerrilla applications.

While biologicals may be employed to inflict great harm on an enemy, = not all=20 biological substances lend themselves to use as weapons of warfare.=20 Additionally, the effects of B-weapons are not immediate, as is the case = with=20 conventional arms and chemical and nuclear weapons, and although full=20 development of their potential takes time (frequently taking from hours = to weeks=20 or longer) and does not have instantaneous impact, the ultimate outcome = of their=20 use can frequently be far more disastrous, in terms of overall impact. = Finally,=20 unlike conventional, chemical or nuclear weapons, inanimate materiel is = not=20 affected by their dissemination; only larger lifeforms and live organic = material=20 are affected. There are both formidable disadvantages applicable as well = as=20 significant benefits obtainable in the use of biological agents as = weapons of=20 war, most of the former having to do with controlling their effects, = once=20 deployed, to achieve the desire result.

Classical biological agents.

Viruses. Viruses are the simplest type of micro organism and are=20 comprised of a central component of chromosomes, surrounded by a protein = layer.=20 Viruses are far more minute than bacteria, ranging from 0.02 pm (1 ~tm = being 1=20 one-thousandth of a millimeter) to about 0.2pm in size. Lacking = reproductive=20 mechanisms, they interact symbiotically with their host cells and are = therefore=20 properly regarded as synergistic intracellular parasites. Viruses need = to=20 establish a complex interaction with a specific type of host cell and=20 characteristically exert so much damage on these cells that they = invariably kill=20 them. Viruses may be spread by respiratory transport or by direct = contact. Some=20 varieties of virus thrive only in the upper respiratory tract, where = they create=20 local infection and may be transmitted naturally by sneezing or = coughing. Other=20 types of virus may be spread through the lymph or blood circulations = within the=20 body, giving rise to infection to certain organs or even branches of the = CNS=20 (Central Nervous System). Viruses are routinely and most commonly = disseminated=20 as deliberate agents of warfare through aerosol sprays or through host = vectors=20 (insects or animals).

Bacteria are single celled micro organisms, varying in shape and = size=20 from globular cells (cocci) of about 0.5 ~tm to rod-like cells (bacilli) = which=20 may be from 1 ~tm to multiples of 10 times longer. Central to many types = of=20 bacteria are special external structures which enhance the capability of = bacteria to create disease. Certain forms of bacteria are able to = transform=20 themselves into spores, given the proper circumstances, which are far = more=20 resistant to bacterial antagonists such as cold, heat, dehydration, = chemicals=20 and radiation than the bacterial form. As an inactive form of bacteria, = they can=20 germinate wherever and whenever the conditions are favorable. Bacteria = have low=20 nutrition requirements, generally, and multiply by cellular division--a = process=20 which is dependent on temperature, oxygen and growth medium available. = Disease=20 creating bacteria tend to favor higher nutrition states and thrive at = human body=20 temperatures.

Diseases may be created by bacteria in two ways, either by directly = invading=20 the tissue or by producing poisonous substances (toxins). Some bacteria = possess=20 both properties. If a bacterium has succeeded in overcoming the body's = defenses,=20 it grows in living tissue. As nutrients are taken from the cells, and as = harmful=20 byproducts are produced, the cells are either severely damaged or die=20 altogether. Infection which begins locally may then spread to other = parts of the=20 human (or animal) body and infect organs or tissue, although the precise = manner=20 in which bacteria are spread is still uncertain. In the case of toxic = byproducts=20 given off by bacteria, the effects may be very severe. An example of the = powerful effects of bacterial toxins (the most powerful poisons known) = is=20 provided by the botulinum toxin: a single gram of this substance, = produced by=20 Clostridium botulinum is sufficient to kill one million people!

Rickettsia is a unique form of bacteria in that Rickettsia cannot = multiply=20 independently, but must interact synergistically with host cells much = like=20 viruses, functioning parasitically in a manner which eventually results = in host=20 cell death.

Fungi. Fungi are much larger than bacteria, with complicated = cellular=20 structures and life cycles. They were among the first biologicals to be=20 described in scientific literature. As unicellular micro organisms that = almost=20 without exception takes on a spore form, fungi may be cultivated = similarly to=20 bacteria but frequently form multicellular, thread-like structures. The = most=20 likely use of fungi as a form of biological weapon is to create crop = disease,=20 rather than direct human disease.

Many fungi may produce extremely poisonous and resistant toxins. = Grain and=20 crops such as peanuts may be infected with fungi of the Fusarium family, = which=20 can create mycotoxins capable of inflicting severe illness when = contaminated=20 food products are ingested. Certain mycotoxins of the tricothecenes = group=20 (Fusarium fungi) have been linked to the so-called `Yellow Rain" = instances of=20 CBW agent use in Southeast Asia in the late 70s and early 80s, and in = the Gulf=20 War another mycotoxin known as aflatoxin was deliberately cultivated by = Iraq and=20 loaded into aerial bombs and Al Abbas missile warheads. Investigation of = a=20 possible link between aflatoxin contamination and Gulf War Syndrome = continues,=20 and low-level aflatoxin exposure is purported to be capable of causing = long term=20 health effects involving CA of the liver.

Methods of transmittal. Most commonly, infection by BW agents is=20 accomplished via respiratory contact, digestion of contaminated = foodstuffs, or=20 by transmission through host vectors such as insects (fleas, mosquitoes, = etc.);=20 this is due to the fact that human membranous surfaces in the = respiratory tract=20 and digestive systems allow rapid and ideal access to the blood = circulation,=20 through the chemical exchange process involving ingestion of nutrients = and=20 excretion of waste products. Biologicals may also be transmitted readily = through=20 urinary tract contamination, the reproductive organs, or the membranes = of the=20 eye. Foodstuffs and water supplies are quite easily capable of being=20 contaminated, and of course plant crops or domestic animals may also be = used as=20 transmission vectors.

Micro organisms commonly transmitted by air. Airborne diseases = easily=20 spread via aerosols include bacterials such as the Plague, or Black = Death=20 (Yersinia pestis), Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), Diptheria = (Corynebacterium=20 dipthermiae), Meningitis (Neisseria meningitides), Tularemia, or `Rabbit = fever'=20 (Francisella tularensis), Parrot fever (Chlamydia psittaci), rickettsias = such as=20 `Q-fever' (Coxiella burnetti), virals such as Lassa fever, Marburg = fever,=20 Smallpox (Variola), Influenza, Adenovirus, and Coxackie virus, and = fungals such=20 as Valley fever (Coccidioides immitis), Nocardiosis (Nocardia = asteroides), and=20 Histoplasmosis (Histoplasma capsulatum).

Micro organisms transmitted via contamination of food and water. = Although=20 the digestive systems acidic fluids are capable of destroying many = infectious=20 agents, micro organisms of the enteropathogens group are capable of = defeating=20 the body's ingestive chemical defenses and infect the human GI system.=20 Bacterials in this class include Cholera (Yibrio chlorae), Typhoid fever = and=20 related salmonella infections (Salmonella typhi, etc.), Dysentery = (Shigelsa=20 dysenteriae), enterotoxin producing E-coli, or ETEC (Escherichia coli), = Undulant=20 fever, or `Malta fever' (Brucella spp), diarrhoeas (Camphylobacter). = Virals=20 favoring this mode of transmission include Yellow fever (epidemic = hepatitis),=20 and Poliomyelitis.

Micro organisms routinely transmitted via (insect) vectors. = Biologicals=20 capable of being transmitted commonly through insect vectors (hosts) = include the=20 bacterials Tularemia and Plague, rickettsias Spotted typhus, and the = virals=20 Dengue fever, Rift Valley fever, Yellow fever, and Venezuelan Equine=20 Encephalitis (there are several prominent strains of encephalitic = viruses found=20 in various parts of the world).

Micro organisms affecting plants. Micro organisms infecting = plantlife and=20 food crops may be effectively used as BW agents. Most plan diseases are = caused=20 by fungal infections (roughly 90% incidence), which may create spores = that are=20 easily spread by wind. After germination and resulting plant destruction = occurs,=20 further spores are produced which are again spread via wind as the = cyclical=20 process repeats itself.

Bacteria and viruses are also capable of infecting crops. It has = been=20 estimated that there are roughly 160 species of bacteria which can = create=20 disease in about 150 different varieties of plantlife. There are also = reasonably=20 serious viral diseases which most major food crops are susceptible to.=20 Furthermore, insects which live on food crops may also spread these=20 crop-destroying biological organisms.

Three examples of serious crop-infecting diseases are Potato Leaf = Mold=20 (Phytophora infestans), Black Rust (Puccinia graminis), and the = bacterium Erwina=20 carotonova.

Micro organisms infecting animals (domestic and non domestic). = Infectious=20 diseases afflicting domestic animals may create severe economic = hardships, and=20 are therefore considered important BW agents for possible war use. = Examples of=20 animal diseases in this category include African Swine Fever (virus), = Hoof and=20 Mouth Disease--also known as Aphthous Fever--(virus), Rinderpest = (virus),=20 Vesicular Exanthema (virus), Vesicular Stomatitis (virus), Swine = Fever--also=20 known as Hog Cholera--(virus), Fowl Plague (virus), Newcastle Disease = (virus),=20 and many others.

Dispersal and transmission modes of BW agents. There are two = general=20 categories of transmission for biologicals: (deliberate and natural), = and four=20 common distribution modes (atmospheric/aerosols, contamination of food,=20 contamination of water supplies, and contact with infected persons, = insects or=20 animals). Dispersal of BW agents through deliberate means gives rise to = diseases=20 which may then be spread naturally (i.e. from person to person).

Atmospheric distribution: aerosols. Biologicals may be released = in=20 liquid, powder or aerosol form. In the case of traditional weapons of = war,=20 biologicals are frequently deployed by aircraft-borne sprayer systems = and may=20 also be put into aerial bombs, artillery projectiles and guided missile=20 warheads. Iraq was found to have loaded at least two or more Al Abbas = /Al=20 Hussein missile warheads with a highly carcinogenic liquid fungal = byproduct=20 (aflatoxin), at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, which has caused = speculation about=20 a possible tie-in to Gulf War Syndrome although there is no hard = evidence that=20 any biological weapons were actually deployed against allied troops. The = Soviet=20 Union is suspected having engaged in aerial spraying of biological = toxins in=20 Southeast Asia and other parts of its vast territories, in connection = with the=20 "Yellow Rain " incidents of the late 70s and early 80s.

Typically, projectile deployment uses high explosive to scatter the=20 biological substance--either in a direct target hit or an airborne = burst--and=20 due to the fact that the rate of fall for explosively aerosolized = solutions=20 (which may range in size from 1 micron to 10 or more) is very low, = airborne=20 drift ranges of many hundreds of miles are unexceptional. This is = particularly=20 true if prevailing winds are strong.

The ideal particle size for effective airborne biological aerosols = capable of=20 causing respiratory infection is between 1 and 5 ul; this may easily be = achieved=20 on a small scale through covert (terrorist) use of pressurised aerosol = canisters=20 (to contaminate public places, for example), or on a large scale through = sophisticated atmospheric spraying operations involving aircraft.

Environmental factors such as ambient air temperature gradients, = landscape=20 patterns and other elements all affect the distribution (and resulting=20 concentration) of biologicals in airborne or aerosolized form. Flat = areas lend=20 themselves most to propagation of biologicals resulting from airborne = spraying=20 than do hilly, forested, or variegated terrain. On the other hand, = ground level=20 release of aerosolized biologicals within protected or sheltered areas = (such as=20 congested urban or forested environments) may enable them to remain = concentrated=20 much longer. Moist areas, such as swamps, heavily precipitated regions = ,or=20 bodies of water, may allow concentrated biologicals to linger longer = than they=20 would otherwise.

Structural habitations initially provide some protection against = aerosolized=20 biologicals but may slowly penetrate and remain within, in a diluted = form, long=20 after the initial aerosol cloud has passed, in the absence of proper = ventilatory=20 precautions. All outdoor exposed surfaces, including water, terrain, and = material goods may be dangerously contaminated as a result of a large = scale=20 dispersal of BW agents.

High levels of UV radiation (sunlight) may degrade or kill certain = types of=20 micro organisms in the atmosphere, although dehydration is also harmful = and=20 serves to retard propagation. In the case of fungal or bacterial spores, = far=20 greater survival times are common; an example is Anthrax, which may = persist for=20 tens of years. Indoors, survival of micro organisms is generally far = better,=20 especially if the agents have been treated by a process known as=20 `microencapsulation.'

Contamination of food products and crops. The process of = contamination of=20 food supplies may be effectively undertaken as a means of spreading = biological=20 agents. In larger applications, biological agents may be used = successfully to=20 contaminate food crops in fields, although use of biologicals on a = smaller=20 scale--such as in covert attempts by terrorists to contaminate food in a = restaurant or public institution--may be equally effective and just as = deadly.=20 Since extreme heat is an antagonist to most biologicals, food preserving = operations employing heat are more difficult to compromise than = processing which=20 involves foods that are ready to eat (fruits, vegetables, etc.). = Generally, most=20 vulnerable are places where food is served. Among the micro organisms = most=20 suited to distribution in this manner are those in the enteropathogenes=20 group--organisms capable of defeating the natural digestive defenses of = the GI=20 tract. Included in this category are the salmonella, shigella and = camphylobacter=20 bacteria. Dairies, farms, poultry operations are, of course, are all as = equally=20 susceptible to use of BW agents as food distribution and preparation = points.

Due to the intensely toxic nature of some biologicals, relatively = small=20 amounts of micro organisms may exact disproportionately deadly effects, = although=20 the scope of the actual consequent impact may be difficult to assess due = to the=20 uncertain aspects of distribution and consumption considerations. = Examples of=20 both deliberate and unintentional contamination of foodstuffs and = consumables,=20 and the relative frequency with which such incidents may occur, may be = found in=20 every day life, and include accidental salmonella and botulism = poisonings, and=20 criminal tampering with food and pharmaceutical products.

Contamination of water supplies. Although the process itself was = not even=20 vaguely understood by the ancients who used it, contamination of = water--either=20 to spread disease and death or to force a besieged enemy to = capitulate--is one=20 of the oldest weapons of warfare in recorded history. The fact that it = has been=20 an effective tool for so many centuries bespeaks of its suitability for=20 producing results in times of conflict.

Water, as a favorable medium for dispersal of many biologicals, is a = very=20 effective mechanism for exploitation by an enemy--either a large, = national=20 entity or a small, covert terrorist group. Water supplies for every = human or=20 animal population may be easily contaminated, even those that are = extremely well=20 regulated for supplying large urban settlements. In most cases, access = to=20 central water sources is readily available, and very few American cities = maintain even moderate security at reservoirs and pumping plants. Agents = may be=20 poured in liquid form directly into the central water reserves, thus = making this=20 particular threat by extremist action groups particularly likely. = Despite the=20 routine addition of chlorine to water supplies to control or eliminate = micro=20 organisms, there are ways in which biological agents may be protected = against=20 the effects of chemicals such as chlorine (microencapsulation is one, = and=20 addition of neutralizing chemicals to counteract the chlorine is = another). In=20 the absence of chlorine, certain biologicals may survive for inordinate = lengths=20 of time. Some bacteria, such as strains of E. Coli may last in excess of = 250=20 days, while Anthrax may survive for years in a water medium. A = B-coxaccie virus=20 has been known to persist in drinking water for slightly under a full = year.=20 Other seriously hazardous biologicals have similar survival times in = water,=20 during which a mortality causing concentration is present.

A favorite, recurring, hypothetical scenario of NBC specialists for a = successful terrorist attack on a large western city has remained one in = which a=20 covert extremist operation contaminates the city's water supply with an=20 especially persistent, virulent biological agent. Due to the fact that = rapid=20 comprehension of the precise process at work would be so difficult to = ascertain,=20 with resulting action severely hampered by consequential delay, the = results of=20 such an attack could very likely result in large scale infliction of = death and=20 serious illness.

Contact with infected persons, animals and insects. A final chief = disease=20 transmission source is physical contact with other human beings or with = infected=20 animals and insects. This contact can be either accidental or = intentional, and=20 in addition to being sneezed upon, coughed at, or coming into contact = with human=20 bodily fluids, biologicals may be deliberately sprayed on items we are = likely to=20 come into contact with in daily life. The human sneeze is a perfect = expression=20 of a biological aerosol weapon, for the sneeze succeeds in creating the = same=20 sort of fine droplet spray that as that created by an airplane, a = pressurised=20 spray can, or an explosively detonated biological projectile.

By virtue of the complicated and uncertain interactions of human = beings, the=20 spread of disease in this manner is also uncertain and the actual = effective=20 result difficult to predict. However, biological warfare is almost as = effective=20 when it brings about a significant reduction of normal human functional=20 capability as when it actually kills or seriously disables. The effects = of human=20 contact with infected individuals can result in more subtle, harder to = detect=20 effects, but which may be no less useful in either a military or = terrorist type=20 action.

Biologicals may also be spread through vectors, or animals and = insects=20 infested with a disease causing substance. Examples of this include = transmission=20 of plague through fleas, carried by rats, and dispersal of diseases = through=20 mosquito, tick and lice bites. Tumalremia, encephalitis, typhus, plague, = Lime's=20 Disease, and Malaria are all examples of vector dispersed contagion.

While certain difficulties are inherent in the use of vector carried = disease=20 for strategic purposes (lack of control over the transmission rates of = the=20 disease, and liability of the instigator--as well as the intended target = population--to the vector-born disease he has released, among others), = making=20 this form of attack less likely than the first three, the possibility = cannot be=20 dismissed.

Protection and decontamination. Although a wide range of = protective=20 measures may be taken to guard against the disease and contagion spread = through=20 biological means, the critical problem of defense centers first and = foremost on=20 detection methodologies. While the west has much recent experience in = devising=20 chemical agent detection systems to provide advanced warning of CW = attack, it is=20 only within the past few years that serious attention has been directed = towards=20 attempting to develop a suitable biological detection science=20 counterpart.

The next and final installment of this three-part investigation = of=20 biological agents will focus on protection and decontamination = techniques=20 applicable for defense against weapons of this type.

 

 

Part Three: Biological Protection = and=20 Decontamination

 

The Protection Triad: Advanced early warning, detection, and = prophylaxis.=20 In terms of a popular comparative analogue, biological weapons have = popularly=20 been regarded as the hypothetical poor man's nuclear bomb, out of = recognition of=20 their devastating potential for creating large number of casualties at = little=20 cost and effort. Perhaps it would be even more appropriate to compare = them to=20 the hypothetical neutron bomb, due to the latter's supposed ability to = destroy=20 biological life without substantially damaging non-organic = structures.

While technical expertise in detection of and defense against = chemical agents=20 has progressed substantially over the past 85 years, biological agent = protection=20 technology is still in its relative infancy. Loathe as the DoD = (Department of=20 Defense) might be to admit NBC preparedness deficiencies on the part of = the US=20 military forces just prior to and during the 1991 Gulf War, today's = American NBC=20 defense establishment will frankly admit that biologicals are still the = wild=20 card in projected rogue CBW threat scenarios which it is estimated the = world=20 currently faces.

The key strategy for biological agent protection and survival is = ideally 1)=20 timely detection, 2) identification of the agent(s), 3) consequent = warning, 4)=20 adequate preventive measures and treatment, and 5) decontamination = capability.=20 With regard to the former, international development effort to produce a = reliable, portable, rugged and simple to operate instrument with which = to=20 predict minute traces of biologicals constitutes a still largely = unrealized=20 goal. The problem of engineering a system which will meet all of the = tactical=20 criteria for practical application is a technical and scientific = challenge of=20 monumental and costly proportions, for which state of the art advances = in=20 research methodologies have yet to produce a reliable, cost effective = break=20 through.

Lacking the vital element of an adequate means of directly detecting=20 suspected biological agents, no advanced early warning capability is = readily at=20 hand in the face of such threats. Instead, traditional techniques of=20 intelligence gathering and intelligent prediction--aspects of warfare = which are=20 inherently prone to error and spurious assumption--must be relied upon = today as=20 they have in the past. One of the principal problems with biologicals, = of=20 course, is that often extremely small quantities of these exceptionally = toxic=20 substances are sufficient to produce the intended effects with almost no = immediately discernible indication. After intelligence analysis and = information=20 reduction, the next indirect detection mechanism indicating possible = bio-attack=20 could possibly be an unusual incidence of reported specific disease = cases at=20 health facilities; by the time symptoms become apparent, it is likely = that large=20 numbers of people have already been exposed to the agent being used, = although=20 even at this advanced stage of attack general issuance of a biological = threat=20 warning and implementation of isolation/containment protocols might = still be=20 useful to help limit casualties.

When warning has been given that a bio-threat is imminent or already=20 unleashed, individual and collective protection measures are immediately = resorted to, just as they would be in a chemical agent situation, for = most=20 protective items such as respirators, filters and garments will protect = equally=20 against both types of agents. Unfortunately, whereas quick acting = chemical=20 agents tend to disperse somewhat quickly (with limited long-term or = residual=20 effects) and biological agents are usually far slower in achieving their = fullest, most devastating potential, by their very nature biologicals = are=20 frequently capable of remaining dangerously threatening to organic life = over a=20 substantially protracted period of time (in some cases, even years or = decades).=20 The wearing of protective gear for relatively short the periods of time = that=20 chemical agents remain threatening is usually possible, but sustained = wearing of=20 protection ensembles against biologicals is both impractical and = inordinately=20 difficult, given the prolonged nature of their functional = mechanisms.

Detection in the air, water, and food. If a BW agent has been=20 air-released, the concentration of organisms will be relatively low = fairly soon=20 after their deployment, compounding their detection against normal = background=20 biological contaminants. Systems for sampling suspected air contaminants = are=20 nominally available and have been in use for decades in civilian = commercial=20 applications, however they are complex, require skilled application, and = demand=20 substantial training in order to be used most effectively. Further, = problems=20 with sensitivity and sample strength in unusual environments pose = special=20 challenges to even the best existing industrial techniques for detecting = biocontagion. These systems are consequently best left to use by = organisations=20 trained in their use and logistically suited to support the costly = nature of=20 their deployment. In the USA, recent military development has focused on = laser=20 radar technology as a means of air-release detection and although the = technique=20 shows promise, these systems are still experimental and quite expensive = to=20 develop.

Fortunately, detection of biocontamination in food or water has been = carried=20 out for many years and there are specific laboratory processes developed = especially for these applications. Again, these techniques, though = standardized=20 and proven in civilian use, are the responsibility of state and Federal = health=20 care organisations which have been set up for their routine employment = in times=20 of peace. Due to the time-consuming processes involved in testing food = and water=20 for contamination, the best protective measure in the event of a = bio-threat is=20 to have substantial stocks of previously stored food and water on hand. = Both=20 food and water contamination processes are more easily detected and = determined=20 than an air-released bio-threat agent; they are also somewhat slower = taking=20 effect than air-released contamination.

Directly observable signs of a possible bio-threat attack might = include=20 observation of unusual clouds of material in the air; reports of = unauthorized=20 entry or access to communal stores of food, water supplies, or = ventilation=20 systems, etc.; discovery of unusual containers or vials filled with = suspicious=20 residue near central air, food and water systems; or the unexplained = discovery=20 of dead animals and/or demonstration of abnormal behavior by = animals.

Unfortunately, identification of specific bio agents, although easier = to=20 accomplish than simple detection, is nevertheless a far more complex = process=20 than untrained lay individuals may reliably undertake.

Protection, individual and collective. As has been noted in the = first two=20 parts of this series, air released bio agents pose a special threat, not = simply=20 because they are harder to detect but because aerosolized bio-organisms=20 frequently infect most readily when suitable concentrations are directly = introduced into the respiratory tract. Fortunately, the filters used in = standard=20 military and civilian NBC respirators effectively screen out air-borne = bacteria=20 and viruses as well as other non biological agents. However, with = biologicals,=20 certain considerations such as proper mask sizing and face-fit assume an = importance of several higher orders of magnitude in comparison with = similar use=20 against chemical agents; beards, especially, pose critical risks in = achieving a=20 face-seal adequate in bio threat circumstances. A protective mask and = filter,=20 however, may not be of substantial value unless some sort of warning has = been=20 given; the same is true for bioprotective suits, although both items = immediately=20 become mandatory when it is necessary to enter into a known = contaminated=20 environment. Baring possession of adequate personal protection against = air-borne=20 (aerosolized) bio agents, even such simple measures as use of a towel or = handkerchief to cover the nose and mouth in the presence of a suspected=20 biological agent are somewhat effective (about as effective as use of a = typical=20 hospital-type surgical face mask).

Collective protective shelters suitable for use against biological = threats=20 are usually constructed with an external air supply duct that first = passes air=20 past aerosol filters before flowing through activated charcoal. Such = aerosol=20 filters are quite effective in screening out both bacteria and viruses = and are=20 essentially scaled up versions of the individual respirator filter used = with=20 masks (which contain both a `mechanical' particulate filter element and = an=20 activated charcoal element that has been bonded with certain metallic = ions).

In constructing such a shelter, not just the air supply must be = dually=20 filtered, but access to the shelter must include a decontamination area = where=20 clothing and garments as well as all exposed parts of the body may be=20 disinfected, prior to entry. This process poses special problems which = most=20 protective shelter designs such as subterranean blast refuges (the = conventional=20 "bomb shelter") do not normally provide for, but it is a serious concern = to bear=20 in mind when planning for or constructing a true omni-environmental = `safe area'=20 for personal or collective protection against the full range of nuclear, = chemical and/or biological threats.

Another serious thought to bear in mind, with regard to maintenance = of a=20 protected bio-safe area, is the possibility of indirect contamination by = individuals who have already been exposed to a bio-threat agent. = Provision for=20 isolation and treatment of such individuals, once the safe area has been = thus=20 compromised, are mandatory if others are not to be contaminated, as = well.

Simple protective measures. In the event of a suspected aerosol=20 bio-attack, assuming that standard individual protection items are not=20 accessible, common sense demands that whatever filter material is = nearest at=20 hand be used to cover the respiratory passages and that all exposed = bodily=20 surfaces be covered in the best manner possible. Raincoats and other = garments=20 intended to provide protection against rain are useful in that they = frequently=20 have attached hoods and use proofed materials. These items confer a = modest and=20 somewhat limited protection, but again, some protection is infinitely = better=20 than none, depending upon the suspected agent in use. All bodily mucous=20 membranes ought to be shielded (nose, mouth, eyes, etc.) and care should = be=20 taken to see that the skin, which has a certain inherent defensive = resistance=20 against infection, is not breached by cuts, wounds and/or other injuries = to it;=20 once the skin has been traumatically penetrated, the chances of = infection=20 increase dramatically--especially in the presence of virulent biological = war=20 agents. The human immune system has a certain limited ability to protect = against=20 specific types of infection, but with regard to exotic viral agents and = other=20 biological materials which are intentionally used as war agents (because = of=20 their extraordinarily lethal nature), the outcome is invariably = poor.

Lacking specific disinfecting materials and suitable decontamination=20 facilities, even such simple acts as washing the exposed areas of skin = with soap=20 and water assume great importance in cases of suspected exposure to bio=20 agents.

Post bio-agent attack medical treatment: Most frequently, the = results of=20 bio agent attack may commonly be seen as epidemic type contagion of = individuals;=20 the circumstances of wartime may facilitate this process further through = the=20 breakdown of normal sanitation and individual hygiene, so minimal normal = standards of good hygiene become critically important in any situation = involving=20 use of biological war agents.

Proper and prompt medical treatment is ideal, though not likely to be = immediately available in the typical scenario wherein bio agents have = been=20 released as a result of a covert regional terrorist action. Once = casualties have=20 been identified, isolation techniques are extremely useful in preventing = further=20 spread of infection through personal contact until proper medical = treatment is=20 available. Against, direct or indirect contact with an infected = individual=20 either through air-borne transmittal or through proximity with bodily = wastes, is=20 to be avoided at all costs and protective personal equipment must be = used.

Assuming that appropriate medical care is not at hand (such as in a = rural=20 home environment), a good reference library of medical information is = highly=20 recommended. Medical references such as The Columbia University College = of=20 Physicians and Surgeons Complete Home Medical Guide or any one of a = number of=20 general medical emergency manuals similar to it are invaluable to have = on hand.=20 Of course, it helps to have read through them beforehand and be at least = mildly=20 acquainted with their content to some degree before an actual bio threat = has=20 materialized. The old adage "Knowledge is a weapon" could justifiably be = restated "Knowledge is protection."

Home medical care, unless undertaken by a somewhat unusually astute=20 individual, usually leaves much to be desired in complex cases of = biologically=20 induced illness. If at all possible, appropriate legitimate medical care = ought=20 to be sought as soon as circumstances and safety concerns allow, for the = sooner=20 treatment is sought, the greater the chances of recovery.

Inoculations and vaccinations. Another protective measure against = biological threat to consider is immunization. While certain types of = commonly=20 encountered infectious and epidemic diseases (such as diphtheria, = chicken pox,=20 yellow fever, cholera, meningitis, tetanus, and encephalitis, hepatitis, = influenzas, etc.) may be prevented with up-to-date inoculations, US = military=20 experience during the 1991 Gulf War has shown that taking `cocktails' of = a=20 number of prophylactic vaccines in close succession may in fact create=20 unforeseen and possibly quite serious consequences (through synergistic=20 interactions producing unintended `side effects'). This theory is = currently=20 under investigation as a possible contributing factor in what we know as = `Gulf=20 War Syndrome.' Scrupulously maintaining currency of a wide range of=20 immunizations against epidemic diseases is not, however, an easy = undertaking.=20 While a far broader range of prophylactic immunizations against exotic=20 biological agents exists in the US, many of them are not readily = available to=20 the public without proper medical authorization at this time. It is = possible to=20 be immunized against anthrax and some of the more deadly diseases that = are=20 considered to have exceptional potential as effective biological war = agents,=20 however prophylactic vaccines for use against bubonic plague need to be=20 administered over a period of several months prior to exposure to be = effective.=20 Further, vaccines for smallpox prevention that are now in stock are = based upon=20 40 year old strains that may have lost effectiveness against new strains = of the=20 disease; additionally, it is estimated that there only enough stocks of = the old=20 smallpox vaccine on hand to inoculate 12 to 15 million individuals. For = more=20 precise information on immunizations it is recommended that appropriate = medical=20 authority be queried for specific answers, such as the US Center for = Disease=20 Control (CDC) and the National Institute of Health (NIH).

Treatment of viral vs. bacteriological & fungal agents. One = of the=20 most important goals of effective medical response to a suspected = biological=20 threat is identification of the specific agent in use. Agents that are=20 bacteriological in origin and action may be effectively treated, in many = cases,=20 with antibiotics. Agents that are viral, on the other hand, are = impervious to=20 antibiotics and are far harder to treat. Further, even some bacterials = are=20 extremely resistant to standard antibiotics and with virals there is = sometimes=20 the additional risk of mutation to deal with. Again, the treatment for=20 biological agents is of such potential complexity that `home care' is = virtually=20 entirely inadequate to deal with the problem. Proper medical treatment = and=20 prompt attention by a physician may make the difference between life and = death=20 in a vast majority of cases, depending upon the concentration of = exposure,=20 severity of symptoms, and such considerations as advanced age, general = health,=20 level of physical fitness, nutrition, etc. In final consideration, = prompt=20 medical attention associated with maintenance of high standards of = sanitation=20 and personal hygiene, in turn combined with adequate personal protection = and=20 shelter, are the keys to immediate survival in the event of a suspected = attack=20 with biological agents.

Much of this protective materiel may be obtained from local = commercial health=20 and safety businesses. Items such as commercial grade HazMat suits, = protective=20 gloves, boots and hoods, as well as respirators, are routinely available = on=20 special order or directly off the retail shelf. An important item to = keep on=20 hand is a supply of standard commercial grade duct tape for sealing = glove and=20 boot junctures to protective suits used for protection against=20 biologicals.

Biological decontamination techniques. It is important to = consider three=20 signal definitions here. The term sterilization refers specifically to = the=20 absolute destruction of all reproductive biological life. Disinfection = defines a=20 state in which all non-desirable microorganisms have been destroyed to = the=20 extent that no risk of infection remains. Decontamination is used in = reference=20 to the removal (but not necessarily the destruction) of non-desirable=20 microorganisms sufficient to preventing their posing an infectious = risk.

Since sterilization is all but impossible anywhere except in special=20 facilities such as hospitals and laboratories, disinfection and = decontamination=20 are the only two possible means of removing the risk of further = contagion from=20 the immediate personal or collective environment.

There are three principal methods whereby objects and individuals may = be=20 `decontaminated.' These are 1) mechanical, 2) chemical, and 3) physical. = Washing, scrubbing and conventional flushing with water are considered=20 `mechanical' techniques in that they mechanically remove the = bacteriological=20 contaminants without rendering them harmless. Disinfecting with = chemicals is=20 perhaps the best method to use and may take the form of a liquid, a gas, = or an=20 aerosol. The effectiveness of the technique varies directly with the = strength of=20 the concentration of disinfectant being used but is also affected by=20 environmental factors such as temperature and the acid-base nature of = the=20 interaction. Substances producing spores, which are far more impervious = to=20 disinfectants than other biologicals, must be treated to higher = concentrations=20 for longer periods of time to achieve the desired effect.

Finally, physical methods that are effective may include exposure to = heat and=20 radiation, although effectiveness varies with the humidity of the = process. Moist=20 heat (such as that used in hospital autoclaves) kills organisms far more = quickly=20 than dry heat. Even boiling water may be effective in certain instances, = although all of these techniques usually require far more effort than = use of=20 specific disinfectants.

Depending on the circumstances, a combination of these techniques may = be=20 needed to achieve the desired level of decontamination. It is important = to bear=20 in mind that the material in question must be considered before a = determination=20 is made of the most effective technique for decontamination. Fabrics, = for=20 instance, may be boiled in hot water for 15 minutes or subjected to 200 = degree=20 (F) water mixed with detergent. Items such as vehicles ought to be = physically=20 scrubbed with disinfectant treated water to remove organisms and prevent = further=20 spread of contaminants.

Decontamination of landscape areas is difficult and expensive to = undertake,=20 although the area must be sprayed to keep the formation of dust down = (danger of=20 inhaled biologicals in the dust) if it is to be used regularly. A = mixture of=20 chloride of lye or lime may be used to physically decontaminate the = ground, if=20 need be.

Interior living spaces may be best decontaminated with aerosolized = commercial=20 disinfectants, all of which are readily available and routinely used in = such=20 places as hospitals. Airing and proper ventilation of treated living = areas must=20 be undertaken immediately after such treatment, however.

The added effect of exposure to sunlight speeds decontamination of=20 bacteriologicals; interior spaces, or spaces in which there is no direct = sunlight (ultraviolet radiation), require substantially more = decontamination in=20 order to achieve the same effect.

Commercial disinfectants recommended for general decontamination use = include=20 phenol, isopropyl alcohol, dilute ammonia and chlorine solutions, = formaldehydes=20 and glutaraldehydes (inhalation of the fumes of which are hazardous), = and=20 chlorohexidine. Substantial quantities must be obtained and stored well = in=20 advance of their actual need for use in either small or large scale=20 decontamination. A very convenient apparatus for use in small to medium=20 applications is the standard US Army portable decontamination apparatus = 1'/2=20 Quart ABC-Ml 1 (NSN 4230-00-720-1618). These handy fire-extinguisher = sized=20 portable sprayers are available as surplus materiel quite inexpensively. = The=20 Standard US Army DS2 solution (Decontaminating Solution No.2) used with = them may=20 also be acquired as military surplus. It is effective against all known = toxic=20 chemical agents and biological materials (except spores) if sufficient = contact=20 time is allowed (for example, 30 minutes is sufficient for = decontaminating VX=20 war agent, which is one of the deadliest nerve agents in the chemical = arsenal).=20 DS2 is supplied in one and a third quart cans (NSN 6850-00-753-4827) and = 5=20 gallon pails (NSN 6850-00-753-4870). DS2 is very effective for = biological agent=20 decontamination,

Summary. As Philip Congdon, respected former Royal Air Force NBC=20 consultant who helped Saudi Arabia structure its chemical and biological = defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, puts it: "In the absence of total = confidence=20 in a biological and chemical warfare detection and alarm system, the key = to=20 survival will always be effective, individual protective equipment." = This is as=20 true for biological protection as it is for the more familiar science of = chemical defense. The maintenance of adequate basic equipment and = supplies for=20 protection against the biological threat is the key to survival, = predicated as=20 it must be on the assumption of proper knowledge and training in the use = and=20 application of such items. Again, as stated on other occasions, one of = the best=20 things an individual can do to prepare against the time when biological = agents=20 are used, either as an act of war or as the result of a regional = terrorist=20 action, is take the time to become as knowledgeable as possible about = the nature=20 of the threat and how to defense successfully against it. Books and = other=20 references then may be seen as equally as important for survival as = possession=20 of respirators and suitable decontamination systems.

One of the most interesting I have seen, specifically addressing the=20 possibility of a future biological threat in the United States, is by a = former=20 microbiologist named Larry Wayne Harris, a controversial individual who = has been=20 arrested for possession of harmful biological substances (Anthrax, etc.) = and who=20 has written a privately produced 100 page booklet "Bacteriological = Warfare: A=20 Major Threat to North America." Availability and/or distribution of = the book=20 is uncertain but it is useful reference material for preparing for and = defending=20 against the possibility of biological attack. This booklet has been seen = at=20 various militaria & gun shows and sells for $5/copy... a bargain = considering=20 the value of the material, which is covered in substantial detail.

Another excellent reference which is difficult to get but extremely = valuable=20 general information on all aspects of biological defense is the latest = (number=20 17) in the Swedish National Defense Establishment series of NBC defense=20 informational works entitled "FOA: A Briefing Book on Biological = Weapons,=20 " that is an updated version (of a previous 1986 edition). One final = book=20 which may be of substantial use is US Army Field Manual FM 3-5 (NBC=20 Decontamination), available as surplus materiel through most = Army/Navy=20 stores.

+++

This article originally appeared in American Survival Guide=20 Magazine (May, June, and July issues) 1998. Some = references and=20 coments may have been rendered slightly out-of-date by the recent events = of late=20 2001.

Addendum dated 3 Mar 2003: = There is a=20 wonderful "no-nonsense" article by an individual formerly in the US = Armed Forces=20 (now retired) named SFC "Red" Thomas. He takes a candid shot at the = present=20 widespread, free-floating anxiety among individuals in the US about the = possible=20 terrorist use of NBC weapons at the attached website. I suggest you dial = it up=20 and read it. It is worthwhile.

http://globalspecops.com/nbc.h= tml=20  

+++

(Return to AEOLUS AEROSPACE=20 homepage)

web hosting dedicated = servers SSL Certificate domain names web=20 hosting
------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CA9D0F.B5E626B0 Content-Type: image/jpeg Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: file:///F:/Lanset_Website_18Jan10/Articles/HM00285_.jpg /9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAAEAYABgAAD//gAfTEVBRCBUZWNobm9sb2dpZXMgSW5jLiBWMS4wMQD/2wCE ABUODxIPDRUSERIXFhUZHzQiHx0dH0AuMCY0TENQT0tDSUhUX3lmVFlyW0hJaY9qcn2Bh4mHUWWV n5OEnnmFh4IBFhcXHxsfPiIiPoJXSVeCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKC goKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCgv/EAaIAAAEFAQEBAQEBAAAAAAAAAAABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwEAAwEBAQEB AQEBAQAAAAAAAAECAwQFBgcICQoLEAACAQMDAgQDBQUEBAAAAX0BAgMABBEFEiExQQYTUWEHInEU MoGRoQgjQrHBFVLR8CQzYnKCCQoWFxgZGiUmJygpKjQ1Njc4OTpDREVGR0hJSlNUVVZXWFlaY2Rl ZmdoaWpzdHV2d3h5eoOEhYaHiImKkpOUlZaXmJmaoqOkpaanqKmqsrO0tba3uLm6wsPExcbHyMnK 0tPU1dbX2Nna4eLj5OXm5+jp6vHy8/T19vf4+foRAAIBAgQEAwQHBQQEAAECdwABAgMRBAUhMQYS QVEHYXETIjKBCBRCkaGxwQkjM1LwFWJy0QoWJDThJfEXGBkaJicoKSo1Njc4OTpDREVGR0hJSlNU VVZXWFlaY2RlZmdoaWpzdHV2d3h5eoKDhIWGh4iJipKTlJWWl5iZmqKjpKWmp6ipqrKztLW2t7i5 usLDxMXGx8jJytLT1NXW19jZ2uLj5OXm5+jp6vLz9PX29/j5+v/AABEIAWcBaAMBEQACEQEDEQH/ 2gAMAwEAAhEDEQA/ALXibxJeaPqEdvbxwMjRByZFJOckdiPSgDJ/4TnU/wDnhaf98N/8VQAf8Jzq f/PC0/74b/4qgA/4TnU/+eFp/wB8N/8AFUAH/Cc6n/zwtP8Avhv/AIqgA/4TnU/+eFp/3w3/AMVQ Af8ACc6n/wA8LT/vhv8A4qgA/wCE51P/AJ4Wn/fDf/FUAH/Cc6n/AM8LT/vhv/iqAD/hOdT/AOeF p/3w3/xVAB/wnOp/88LT/vhv/iqAD/hOdT/54Wn/AHw3/wAVQAf8Jzqf/PC0/wC+G/8AiqAD/hOd T/54Wn/fDf8AxVAB/wAJzqf/ADwtP++G/wDiqAD/AITnU/8Anhaf98N/8VQAf8Jzqf8AzwtP++G/ +KoAP+E51P8A54Wn/fDf/FUAH/Cc6n/zwtP++G/+KoAP+E51P/nhaf8AfDf/ABVAB/wnOp/88LT/ AL4b/wCKoAP+E51P/nhaf98N/wDFUAH/AAnOp/8APC0/74b/AOKoAP8AhOdT/wCeFp/3w3/xVAB/ wnOp/wDPC0/74b/4qgA/4TnU/wDnhaf98N/8VQAf8Jzqf/PC0/74b/4qgA/4TnU/+eFp/wB8N/8A FUAH/Cc6n/zwtP8Avhv/AIqgA/4TnU/+eFp/3w3/AMVQAf8ACc6n/wA8LT/vhv8A4qgA/wCE51P/ AJ4Wn/fDf/FUAH/Cc6n/AM8LT/vhv/iqAD/hOdT/AOeFp/3w3/xVAB/wnOp/88LT/vhv/iqAD/hO dT/54Wn/AHw3/wAVQAf8Jzqf/PC0/wC+G/8AiqAD/hOdT/54Wn/fDf8AxVAB/wAJzqf/ADwtP++G /wDiqAD/AITnU/8Anhaf98N/8VQAf8Jzqf8AzwtP++G/+KoAP+E51P8A54Wn/fDf/FUAH/Cc6n/z wtP++G/+KoAP+E51P/nhaf8AfDf/ABVAGt4Z8SXmsahJb3EcCosRcGNSDnIHcn1oAyfHv/Iah/69 1/8AQmoAyLGyjuYS7s4IbHBpNnZh8PGpG7LH9lQf35PzH+FK50fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPuw/ sqD+/J+Y/wAKLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH+FFw+p0+7D+yoP78n5j/Ci4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPu w/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UXD6nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8KLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH+FFw+p0+ 7D+yoP78n5j/AAouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UXD6nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8KLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH+FFw+p 0+7D+yoP78n5j/Ci4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UXD6 nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8ACi4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UX D6nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8KLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH+FFw+p0+7D+yoP78n5j/Ci4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hR cPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wAKLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH+FFw+p0+7D+yoP78n5j/Ci4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/ hRcPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UXD6nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8KLh9Tp92H9lQf35PzH +FFw+p0+7D+yoP78n5j/AAouH1On3Yf2VB/fk/Mf4UXD6nT7sP7Kg/vyfmP8KLh9Tp92H9lQf35P zH+FFw+p0+7D+yoP78n5j/Ci4fU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3ZXvrKO2h Dozklscmmmc+Iw8acbo1/AX/ACGpv+vdv/QlpnGHj3/kNQ/9e6/+hNQBQ0n/AI9m/wB8/wAhUs9T B/w36l2kdYUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFAEU9zFbj94wB7A dTTM6lWFP4mU21bqEh+hLU7HI8b2RF/as/8Acj/I/wCNFjP65U7IjOoXJJIkA9go4osZvFVe4f2h c/8APX/x0f4UWD6zV7/kH9oXP/PX/wAdH+FFg+s1e/5B/aFz/wA9f/HR/hRYPrNXv+Qf2hc/89f/ AB0f4UWD6zV7/kSJqk64DBGx1OME0WLjjKi31LEeqxN99GU57cilY6I4yL+JWLMd1BJ9yVc5xg8G ixvGtTlsyWkahQAUAFABQAUAUtW/49l/3x/I00cmM/hr1L/gL/kNTf8AXu3/AKEtUeWHj3/kNQ/9 e6/+hNQBQ0n/AI9m/wB8/wAhUs9TB/w36l2kdYUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAF ABQAUAFABQAUAZc+oSzP5VuMAnA2jLN9Kqx5tXFSk+WBrQeGIyC11cO7nB+TjB78nOf0ouJYe+sm aMOkWEOdlrGc/wB8bv55pGqpQXQuKqooVQFUDAAGABQabC0AFABQAUAFAEElnayuXktoXY9WZASa CXCL1aKzaHpzMWNsMk54ZgPyzTuR7GHYqSeF7UoRHPMrdi2CPywKLkPDR6Mz7rRb+x+a2dpowc/u +vbqv/6+lBDhUp/CynHqc6/e2uM9xg0WHHF1FvqXbfUIpyFOUc9Aeh/GlY66WJhPR6MtUjpCgAoA pat/x7L/AL4/kaaOTGfw16l/wF/yGpv+vdv/AEJao8sPHv8AyGof+vdf/QmoAoaT/wAezf75/kKl nqYP+G/Uu0jrCgAoAKACgCJrqBVyZkwPQ5p2MnWppX5iF9Tt1OBvb3A/xosZSxdNbajf7Vg/uSfk P8aLC+uU+zD+1YP7kn5D/GiwfXKfZh/asH9yT8h/jRYPrlPsw/tWD+5J+Q/xosH1yn2ZL/aFr/z1 /wDHT/hRYv6zS7/mSrNE7BVlRiewYUjVVIN2TQ+gsKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgCpqU/lW+wfek4/DvT RzYqpyQsupP4XsldnvH5KHYgz0OOT+R/nTZx4eH2jpKR1hQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAUr7Sr S+yZY9sn/PROG/8Ar9O9BnOlGe5z194fu7XLRD7RH6oPm/L/AAzTucs6Eo7alS2v5YBtPzp6E9Pp RYqliZU9HqjUt7mK4XKHn+6eopHo060ai90lpGpS1b/j2X/fH8jTRyYz+GvUv+Av+Q1N/wBe7f8A oS1R5YePf+Q1D/17r/6E1AFDSf8Aj2b/AHz/ACFSz1MH/DfqXaR1hQAUAVrm+igyAQ7/AN0H+tOx z1cTCnotWOtdIvdRbfeM0EI5CkYJ56Advqf1pnJy1KrvN6GqugacqgGAsQMZLtk/rRc09hDsWf7P sv8An0t/+/Y/wpFckewf2fZf8+lv/wB+x/hQHJHsTRQxQKVhjSNSc4RQBmgpJLYfQMKACgBjRRuc uisfUjNA02iKWyt5Rho8f7pK/wAqAbbVrmfPo0682l2cDokoznn+91xQQ/aL4ZfeZk817Zf8fdpg HoQePz5GadiPrVSHxx/r8RYdRgl4YmM/7XT86VjaniqctHoWqR0hQAUAFABQBi6g7NduGGNvAHtV I8jEybqO50nhmJo9L3EjEkhYY9On9KGbYdWga1I3CgAoAKACgAoAKAEYhVLMQFUZJPQCgG7bkelz rqMzvCA1pGNu85BZ+DgD0APOe5qkjnda/wAJpy20U0ZRkwD3QlT+Y5qrIz5n3Kc+iW8qBUnu4TnO 5LhifpyTRZCu+7Ob1SKO1uHih124R0bBjnEgI4/vAc/l0NTZEOUl9oyzqN5bz/u795dvRgzFTx6M P5igSqTT3L9n4mmjAW6jEoz99flOO/HQ/pSsaxxDXxF8LpevAkArMBk4G1wOn0PT3xmjY1/d1fUy bzQLy0O+HM6DoUHzDp2/wzRcwlRnDVDLTUudtyeOzge/f2+lFjeljGtJjtSkSWzRo2DDeOn0NJGm KlGVNOL6mj4C/wCQ1N/17t/6EtUeaHj3/kNQ/wDXuv8A6E1AFDSf+PZv98/yFSz1MH/DfqXaR1hQ BFdTCC3d84OML9aaMq0+SDYnhzTPNcXsv3EOI1I6n1+g/n9KbPOoU7+8zpqR2BQAUAFABQAUAFAB QAUAFABQAUAZl3oNlchiieTIejJ06enTFO5jKhGXkZkuk6jYEm2YXEQBOO4/D/CgmPtaXwu6GQXq SOY3UxSA4Kt656fWlY6qWJjN2ejLNI6AoAKAMnVY9twHAwHHX1I/yKpHmYyNp37m94au45LAW2QJ IiflzyQTnP64/wD10MrDyTjy9jYpG4UAFABQAUAFABQBx2t311cXTQXACLExARc4+vPXjvTOCrOT dmd1pP2f+zLb7J/qPLG3pn3zjjOc5981Y1toW6BmTqfiG20u6+z3EM5YqGBQKQR+fsaLkuVjB8SS aZqUZvbK5i86PAkUgq0gPAxnqR/L6CkyJWeqOcpEBQBZ028axvY5xnaDhwO696C6c+SVzuqk9IpX 2lWl9kyx7ZP+eicN/wDX6d6DOdKM9zmtU0eXTQHLrJEx2hhwc47j8/yqjjqUnDU1PAX/ACGpv+vd v/QloMg8e/8AIah/691/9CagChpP/Hs3++f5CpZ6mD/hv1LtI6woArSRLfahb2RcqpJZyMdhn8+v 500cWJanNUzqFVUUKoCqBgADAAoL2FoAKACgAoAKACgAoArXF/aWu4TXEalcZXOW/Ic0ESnGO7JL WU3jqIYJjGVDeaybV5zjrgn8Aeop2ZPto9C09tIgzgN9KLMaqRZFSNAoAKACgClqOl2+oJ+8G2UD CyDqP8RQZzpqe5zMhvdLl8qdSVBwM9GHH3TTsYRrVKLs9i3bXsVxhRlX/umlY7qWIhU0W5YpG5Dd 24uYSvAYfdJ7U0Y1qSqRt1MuyupNOvRKoyUJVlz1HcVR5UW6cvQ7W3uoLpd0EqSDAJ2nkZ9R2qTv jJS2ZLQUFABQAUAFABQBzviix+5eRr/sSYH5H+n5U0cuIh9pGdpuuX2mYWCXdEP+WUnK9/y654xT ucqk0Gp6xPfal9sQtAyqFQI3KDHqMep/OgG7u5FqGoz6k0b3O1pUXb5gGCwzkZHTjJ6AUA3cqUCC gAoAVVZ2CqCzE4AA5JoA9CqT1QoAxvFX/INj/wCuw/kaaOfEfCReAv8AkNTf9e7f+hLTOIPHv/Ia h/691/8AQmoAoaT/AMezf75/kKlnqYP+G/Uu0jrCgDPjkaPxBEyHBMiL+BAB/Q1XQ8uq7Yj7jsKR 1BQAUAFABQAUAZmvag1haKIm2zSHCnHQDqemPb8aaMa1TkWm5h6dBd69ffZpLmTbzIxJyF99uR3I HHrTSOO8pvVnY2Gg6fp4BjgEkgIPmS4Zsg8Y9PwxVWLUUjSoKCgDO1x3ttNmuoIw8sYBAwSMZGc4 9s/lSaGqkorQx7HxBaXOFlP2eT0c/L+f+OKmxtCvGW+hq0jYKACgCC7tIr2BoZlyp6HuD6j3oJlF SVmclqelzaZIp3F4z92QDHPp7GqOGdN03cs2N6JxskwJB/49UtHoYfEe092W5bpHUUtQszNiSIDe Oo6ZppnJiaDn70dzOxPayBhvicZwwyD+BqjzpRnTeuhpWniO7gCpMFnQd24bp6/4ilY0jXkt9Tdt dZsblNwnWIjqspCkf0P4UjqjVhLqWorq3nYrDPFIwGcI4JxQUpRezJaCgoAKAI7iBLmB4ZBlHGD7 e/1oFJKSszj9U0qXTXGT5kTfdkAxz6H0NUcFSk4FCgyCgAoAKACgDe8P6TJ9oNzdRPGIj8iuuMn1 59P89KTOqjSd+aR0tI6woAxvFX/INj/67D+Rpo58R8JF4C/5DU3/AF7t/wChLTOIPHv/ACGof+vd f/QmoAoaT/x7N/vn+QqWepg/4b9S7SOsKAMm4l8jVhNt3eW6tjOM4wapbHk4h2rN+h21I7AoAKAC gAoAKAOM1y8W81F2TBRBsUjuB3/MmqR59afNLQ1fBt3ZW87xSkrdTHajMBtx/dB6gk/ngd6aJg0d LqeqW2lQCW5Y/McKi8s30FM0bsQ2HiDTr9lSOby5W6RyDaeuMZ6E+wNFxKSZg694hv7fVpoLS4VI o8KNqq2TjnJOec5H4UmyJSd9Ci3ijUZLSW2mMUolUqWZMMARjjGB+lFxczMekSdB4d1Ztwsrhxtx iJmPOf7v+H5elJnVQq/ZZ0dI6woAKAGyRpKhSRFdD1VhkGgTSejOP1ezOmahmHKxt80Z649R/nsR TOGcXSneJas7tblOwkHVf6ik0elQrqqvMsUjcRlV12soYHsRQJpNWZUm02GQkoTGT6dPyp3OaeEh LVaFKbT54idq71Hdf8KdzjnhakdtUVaZzEsV1cQKVhnljUnOEcgZoKUpLZlyPXdRj2jz9wXHDKDn 6nrRYtVprqW4vFFwGPnW8TrjohKnP60rGixMuqNjTtXttQGFPly942PJ47eo60johVjMuyRpKhSR FdD1VhkGgtpPRmFN4XjeVmiuTGhPClN2PxzTuc7wyvoyCbwtMuPJuY39d4K4/LNFyHhn0YQ+Fpjn zrmNPTYC2fzxRcFhn1ZNH4WQODJdMydwqYP55NFylhl1ZsW1jbWg/cQohxjcBzj69aR0RhGOyLFB QUAFAGN4q/5Bsf8A12H8jTRz4j4SLwF/yGpv+vdv/QlpnEHj3/kNQ/8AXuv/AKE1AFDSf+PZv98/ yFSz1MH/AA36l2kdYUAY+pxst2WPRwCD+lUjysXFqpfudHoWqfb4TFLgTRAZOfvj1/xoNaVXnWu5 q0jYKACgAoAKAON1yx+xX7bFxFJ86YHA9R+H8sVSPPrQ5ZGdQZD5JZJdvmSM+xQq7jnAHQD2oAZQ AUAFABQAUAd3YMz2FszEsxiUkk8k4FSenD4UWKCgoAKAMnxJaCfT/NAJeA7hgZ4PX/H8KaMK8bxv 2Ob059l4nIAbIP8An64oZjhZWqo2qk9cKACgAoAY0MTtuaJGJ7lRQQ6cG7tIiawtmz+7wT3BPFO5 k8NSfQgfSkONkrD1yM0XMpYKPRjf7J/6b/8Ajn/16dyfqX978Crd2j2zDJ3IejYoTOatQlSfkdFo Gq/ao/s1xJmdfuk/xr/U/wCfWhm1GrzLle5s0joCgAoAKACgAoAKACgDG8Vf8g2P/rsP5GmjnxHw kXgL/kNTf9e7f+hLTOIPHv8AyGof+vdf/QmoAoaT/wAezf75/kKlnqYP+G/Uu0jrCgCK6gFxCUPX qp9DTRlWpqpHlMWOSW1uA8bFJYz1HY1R4+sJeaOx0nUV1G13kBZFOHUHv6j2qTvp1OdXL1BoFABQ AUAZ2uWP22wbYuZY/nTA5PqPx/nimjKtDmicbTPPCgAoAKACgAoAKAO607/kG2v/AFxT+QqT0ofC izQWFABQAjKrqVYBlIwQRwRQBwEEginjkZdwRgxXOM4PSqPMjLlaZ0Ui7JGTOdpIzUHup3Q2gAoA KACgAoAKACgBHRZEKOAVPUUClFSVmY0izafdB42KFTlHFUePUpyoz/I6zS9Ti1CEchZgPnT+o9qR 2QmpovUFhQAUAFABQAUAFAGN4q/5Bsf/AF2H8jTRz4j4SLwF/wAhqb/r3b/0JaZxB49/5DUP/Xuv /oTUAUNJ/wCPZv8AfP8AIVLPUwf8N+pdpHWFABQBTvrHzz5kZAcDp/eppnJiMP7T3o7lCCa4026E iZR16g9GHp7iqPP9+lLXRnTabrtvebIpf3U5wMH7rH2P+Pr3pWOunWUtHuatI2CgAoAKAKNxo9hc LhrdEIBAMY2kfl1/GgzlSg+hlXPhds5tbgEZ+7IOg+o/wp3MJYb+VmRc6dd2gzPbuqgZLDkD8RxT MJU5R3RWoICgBVVnYKoLMTgADkmgDoNI8P8A3Li9HuISPy3f4f8A6qVzrpUOsjoVVUUKoCqBgADA ApHVsLQAUAFABQBwd+qpf3KqAqiVgABgAZNUeZPSTNqEsYUMhJcqNxbrn3qT2qd+RX7DqRYUAFAB QAUAFABQAUAMmhSeMo4yD+lBE4RnHlkZckFxp8qzxOfkOQ69vqKq55lShOi+ZbdzWsfEy4SO8jIO MGVe59SP8PyosVDEdJG7BcRXMYkgkV0PcHp/gaR0qSkrokoGFABQAUAFAGN4q/5Bsf8A12H8jTRz 4j4SLwF/yGpv+vdv/QlpnEHj3/kNQ/8AXuv/AKE1AFDSf+PZv98/yFSz1MH/AA36l2kdYUAFABQB HNBHOm2RQfQ9x9KZE6caitIyrqwkgyy5eP1HUfWmmeZWw0qeq1Rb03Xbiz2RS/vYBgYP3lHsf8fT tRYmnWcdHsay+JrJmAKTqCcZKjA/Wixv9YgWotZ0+Ziq3SAgZ+fKj8zSLVWD6l6g0CgAoAKACgAo AKACgAoAKACgAoAbJIsUbSOcIgLMfQCgTdldnBfvLq5/vSyv7DLE1R5msmb9Qe8FABQAUAFABQAU AFABQAUAFAFC601Xy8GFb+72P+FNM4q2ET1gUY5Z7KfMbtFIvBwf85FUcHvU5W2ZrweKJUjCz26y sP4g23P4YPNKxssS0tUWovFFuVPnW8qNnohDDH6UWLWJj1RaXX9OZQTOVJHQo2R+lFjT28O5FJ4l sUcqomcD+JVGD+ZBosS8RBFe58TxeV/osLmTP/LQDAH4GixMsQre6jBuru4vH33ErOR0z0H0HQUz llJy3N/wF/yGpv8Ar3b/ANCWgkPHv/Iah/691/8AQmoAoaT/AMezf75/kKlnqYP+G/Uu0jrCgAoA KACgAoAqXOnxztuU+WxOSQM5p3OarhYzd1oyu+kuB8kqk+4xTuc8sE+jIX024U4Cq3uD/jRcylhK q2VyFo5rdgxV0KnhumD7GmYyhOG6sWotZ1CFSq3TkZz8+GP5mgaqzXU1bHxKHfZeosYOcOgOB7Ec mlY3hiP5jfVldQykMpGQQeCKR1C0AFABQAUAFABQAUAFAGdr8/kaVLhtrSYQcZznqPyzTRlWlaDO UsVLXkWDtIbcD9Of6UM5aEeaokblSeyFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAEAgggEHqDQDV9GVpdPt 5OdpQ+q8U7nPPC05dLFSXSnGTE4Yc8Hg07nNPByXwsrPaXCHBhf8Bn+VO5zSoVI7ob9mn/54yf8A fJoF7Kp/K/uFFtOSAIZOfVTQCo1H9lj57KS3hEkhXkgYFK5dTDypx5pG74C/5DU3/Xu3/oS0zAPH v/Iah/691/8AQmoA56G4lgz5blQe3ag0hVnD4WXodV6iaP8AFKVjshjf519xdhuIp8+W4Yjt3pHX CrCfwskpGgUAFABQAUAFABQAEAgggEHqDQDV9GUrjTY5MtEdjenb/wCtTuclTCRlrHQzp7aW3OJF IHYjoao8+pSnT+JEtjqNzp75hfK85RuVP4etAoVJQ2Oostbs7uMs0iwMMZWRgPyPcUrHbCtGS7Gj SNQoAKACgAoAjnuIraMyTyLGg7k9f8TQJyUVdmDf+JeqWSe3mOPr0H5dfyp2OaeI6RMUtcahcZd2 kkPdj0H9BTMIxnVlZbmpZ2i2ydjIep/oKls9ShQVJeZYpG4UAFABQAUAFABQAUAMlmjhXMjhR/Og idSMFeTKkmqxL/q0ZjnvwKdjmljIr4Vcpy6hcScbgg9F4p2OSeJqS62JRpWoTI0zQOAPvNKwXp/v HpTIdOpLVkcZuYDtSZABxjzVI/nSLg6sPhf4ouRXs/8Ay0tnI/vICR/9f86VjrhiKn2o/cTx3cMh 2hwrdNrcHPpRY3jWhLS+pNSNQoAKAKWrf8ey/wC+P5Gmjkxn8Nepf8Bf8hqb/r3b/wBCWqPLDx7/ AMhqH/r3X/0JqAK+iaVa3+nyNMrCQSFQ6tggYB+n6Ujpo0ozjqSzeFlyxguSBj5Vdc8+5H+FFynh uzMy70a9swzPFvjXq6HI6Z+uPwpmMqUokUOoTxAjcHH+3zjp3/ClYuGJqQ639S5DqcT58wGM/mKV jshjIP4tC4rK6hlYMD3BpHUmmroWgYUAFABQAUAFAAQCCCAQeoNANX0ZTn0yKQ5jJjPfAyKdzkqY SEtY6GfPaTW/Lrlf7w5FO5w1KE6e60G291PatugleM5BO08HHqO9MzjJx2ZqW/iW7j2iZI5QM5ON rH8uP0pWNo4iS3JZfFMpUeTbIjZ6uxYY/SixTxL6Iry+I7+RQF8qI56ovP65osQ8RNkX9val/wA/ P/ji/wCFOxPtp9yozXN7LuYyTP0yecf4CgSU6j01LEWlytzIyp7dTSudEMHN/E7GhbW6W0e1eSer etI7qVKNKNkVr2/aCby4wpIHzZzQkYV8S6cuWJCmquM74lPpg4p2Mo42XVD/AO1v+mH/AI//APWo sV9d/u/iH9rf9MP/AB//AOtRYPrv938ST+1YP7kn5D/GlY0+uU+zGvqqDGyJj65OKLEyxseiIW1W Ut8saAehyadjJ42d9EQtfXLLgynHsAKLGLxFVq1yaLTtRvVDLDK6gZBc4BB9M9fwoFy1Km92X4fC 0xz51zGnpsBbP54ouWsM+rL8HhuyjwZTJMcYILYGfXjn9aLmqw8VuSSNpuhoWVFV2/hX5nIP1Occ fTigb9nSOe1HV7nUDhj5cXaNTwee/qelM5Z1ZTKFBkKrMjBlYqR3BxQNNp3RMl5cJnErHPrz/OlY 1jXqR2ZNb3867Y1jRsdlXBP5UWNaeJqK0Url6K4mflrV1X/eGfyOKR2wqzerh/X4FikblLVv+PZf 98fyNNHJjP4a9S/4C/5DU3/Xu3/oS1R5YePf+Q1D/wBe6/8AoTUAS+Ff+QbJ/wBdj/IUmduH+E2a R0BQBnX+i2l7ltvlSn+NO556jv1+vvTMp0YyOev9Fu7LLbfNiH8adhz1Hbp9Penc5J0ZRKltcyWz gqSV7rng0WClWlTemxr21zHcICpAbuueRU2PVpVo1FpuTUjUKACgAoAKACgAoAKAKsunwSNnBQ/7 PFO5zzwtOTvt6DP7Kg/vyfmP8KLkfU6fdh/ZUH9+T8x/hRcPqdPuw/sqD+/J+Y/wouH1On3ZJFp9 vHztLn1bmi5cMLTj0uWQAoAAAA6AUjoStogoAZNKIYWkPRR+dBFSahFyZhKr3E4VRukkbA7ZJNWe LrJ+bOqtfD9mlui3EYklA+ZgzAE/nSudkaEUtdyX+wdN/wCfb/x9v8aLlexh2D+wdN/59v8Ax9v8 aLh7GHYr/wDCMWX/AD1uP++h/hRcj6vEkh8O2Eed6yS5/vv0/LFFylQgi1HpdjGgRbSEgf3lDH8z zSLVOC6FugsKAEZlRSzEKoGSScACgNjntS8R9Y7D2/ekfoAf6/8A16djlqYjpE59mZ2LMSzE5JJ5 JpnICqzsFVSxPYCgaTbsizHp1w/VQgxnLGlc6I4WpLpYsx6Uo/1kpPHRRjmi50RwS+0ywlhbpg+W CR3Y5zSubxw1KPQnVVRQqqFA7AYpGySSshaBhQBS1b/j2X/fH8jTRyYz+GvUv+Av+Q1N/wBe7f8A oS1R5YePf+Q1D/17r/6E1AEvhX/kGyf9dj/IUmduH+E2aR0BQAUAFAGZqei296jPGqxT9Q44BPuP 69aZjUoqW25yjpNZ3BVgY5YzyPSmcScoS7NGnY3onGyTAkH/AI9UtHp4fEe092W5bpHUFAEczvGA UjMg/iweQP60yJylHVK5HHf28mBv2k9mGP8A61FjKOJpy62LAIIBBBB6EUjoTvqgoAKAEd0jGXZV HqTigUpKOrYiSxucJIjH0BzQKM4y0THUFBQAUAFADZZUhTfIwVaCZzjBXkzIurqS8cRony7vlUDJ J7VSR5dau6ui2N/w/pLWqm5uEAlYfIpHKD/E0M0o0uX3nubVI6AoAKACgAoAKACgCC7u4rKBppmw o6DuT6D3oJlJRV2cnq2qyajLgZSBT8if1Pv/ACqjhqVHN+RDDp88pGV2L6t/hSuaQwtSW+iLsWmQ p/rCzn8hSudcMHBfFqW1VUUKqhQOwGKR1JJKyFoGFABQAE4BPPHoKAbsM8xmQtHBPJj+7E3+FOxl KtFdH9zK1xfm3YK1tKrEZxINpxRYwnjFHaLKd3ffaYgnl7cHOd2aaRzVsR7WNrWNrwF/yGpv+vdv /QlpnKHj3/kNQ/8AXuv/AKE1AEvhX/kGyf8AXY/yFJnbh/hNmkdAUAFABQAUAZ+raVHqMWRhJ1Hy P/Q+38qZlUpqa8zkJYpbaYxyKUkQ8juDTOBpxfma9ndrcp2Eg6r/AFFS0evQrqqvMsUjcKAKV5p6 y7pIuJOuOx/+vTTOSvhlO8o7mbHLLbudjMh7j/EVR50ZzpvR2Jf7Quf+ev8A46P8KVjX6zV7/kSQ 3GoT58kSSbeuyPOPyFFkNYis9n+BK+iao5y8LMfUyKf60Eyp1Zasq3FndWTZmhePBGGxxnrwRxTM 3GUHqOh1CeIgFt6js3+NKxtDFVI76ovw6paFQZlnB7qig/qT/SlY6PrsbbEv9q6Z/cu/yX/GiwfX F2EbWLCONjDBM8v8Pm42g++DTsTLGaaGU7T6jecJukkOFVBgD2HoKZxylKpLXc6bR9FWw/ezFXnP AI6KPb39/wDJR2UqPJq9zVpGwUAFABQAUAFABQBU1HUItOg8yTljwiDqx/w96CJzUFdnI6jqEuoT +ZJwo4RB0Uf4+9UcE5ubuyfTrMllnkGAOVB7+9Js7MLQd+eXyNKpPQCgAoAKAIsXNzJ5VlHuIOHk P3V/H15p2OarWlflpmja6Mow17K1w/HydEHfp359fyoM+WUvjd/yNGOKOIYjRUHooxQX5D6AEZVd SrAMpGCCOCKAOc8Raba2tsk8Efls0mCAeDkE9O3TtTRyV6cYq6JvAX/Iam/692/9CWmcoePf+Q1D /wBe6/8AoTUAT+FEY6XKwUkCY8/8BFJo7MPJctjXpHSFABQAUAFABQBzHiqBUuoZxgGRSCAO47/r +lNHHiI2aZjQSmGZZB1U/nTMac3CSkjfVg6hlOQRkVB7aaauhaBhQBVv7YTwlgP3ijjHf2po58RR U43W6I/Ds0KX4jnjjbzMbGZQSrDpgnp/jimzz6DSlZnXUjuCgAoAzbnQbC4ORGYmJ5MZx+nT9Kdz KVGDI4vDdhGxLebKMYw7cfpii5Kw8ETLoenKwYWwyDnlmI/LNFyvYw7E/wDZ9l/z6W//AH7H+FIr kj2JIrW3gYtDBFGxGMogBxQNRitkS0FBQAUAFABQAUAFABQBzHiuVjdwxYG1Y9w9ck4/oKaOPEv3 kjJs4lmuUR87T1/KmzOhBTqKLN0AKAAAAOgFQe0lbRBQAUAFAFS9vhb/ACR4MvuMhaaRy4jEKmuW O5v6TaGy0+KFgA+Nz4Hc/wA8dPwoM6ceWKRcoNAoAKACgDG8Vf8AINj/AOuw/kaaOfEfCReAv+Q1 N/17t/6EtM4g8e/8hqH/AK91/wDQmoA0fBP/ACCJf+u5/wDQVqkaw2MrxcWtNbElu7xPLCpdkYgn kj+QH5UmKTaegzT/ABJIrLHeqGUnHmKMEfUd+3T9amxtDEPaR0cUiTQpNEwaNxlWHQ0jqjJSV0Oo GFABQBm+ILY3GlyEAloiJAAfTr+hNNGVaN4HHUzzzY0vd9kG7pk7fp/+vNSz1sJf2epbpHSFABQB h3EbW10QuU2nchBPHpg1Z4tWDpzaOy028W+so5xjcRhwOzd6k7ac+eNy1QWFABQAUAFABQAUAFAE VxdQWq7p5UjGCRuPJx6DvQTKSjuzPm8RWEeNjSS5/uJ0/PFOxm68EUv+Eq/6c/8AyL/9aixn9Z8i WHxTCc+dbSJ6bCGz+eKLDWJXVGjb6rY3LbYrlC2QAG+Ukn0z1pG0asJbMuUFhQByHiRpDqzh87Qq hMjHGP8AHNNHBXvz6kGk/wDHy3+4f5ihm2D/AIj9DWqT0woAKAEZgilmOABk0CbSV2ZulQNqOqpv AIB8x8jIwO2D26CqPHherUuzs6R3hQAUAFABQBjeKv8AkGx/9dh/I00c+I+Ei8Bf8hqb/r3b/wBC WmcQePf+Q1D/ANe6/wDoTUAaPgn/AJBEv/Xc/wDoK1SNYbF/WdFh1dIxLJJG0QbYVxjJx1HfoPSi w3G5zV94PvYMG1dbkHqOEYfmcY/Hv0pWIcGZVvc3mlXDBQ0T8b43XGe/IP8AnmkEZyg9DrdO1CLU IPMj4YcOh6qf8PepO+E1NXRboLCgBskayxtG4yjgqw9QaBNXVmefVR5Zv20flW8aYwQOR796k9ul HkgkSUjQKACgDF1CTzLt+chflH+frmqR5GJlzVH5HSeHLSS2sTJIx/fEOq5yAMcH6n/Chm1CLjG7 6mtSNwoAKACgAoAKACgCpqOoRadB5knLHhEHVj/h70ETmoK7KGm6DNre6/1SSSNJB+6VODj15zhf T16/XCrX5XaJwu83eRtQ+GNJi2H7LvZMcu7HJHqM4/TFc7rzfUfKiy+j6a6MpsLYBhg4iAP5jpUe 0n3CyPNpongmeKQbXjYqwznBHBr007q6MhlMDoNI19ty296w24wsp65/2v8AH8/WlY6qVfpI6Okd ZzfiuDEkE4DcgoT2GOR+PJ/KmjkxK1TKOkMA0q55IBH+fxoZrgmrtGlUnoBQAUAVdTDfY22kAAjd 7j/9eKaObF39k7GZZ3LWd3HOnJQ5x6juPyqjy4y5Xc7uORZY1kQ5RwGU+oNSekndXQ6gYUAFABQB jeKv+QbH/wBdh/I00c+I+Ei8Bf8AIam/692/9CWmcQePf+Q1D/17r/6E1AGj4J/5BEv/AF3P/oK1 SNYbHQ0FjXDFGCEBscEjIB+lAjy+7877XN9p/wBd5jeZ0+9nnpx1qTBljSr57G8Rg+2JiBICMgr6 49RQaU5uEjtqk9EKACgDgLdPMnjQgkFhke1UebTjzTSN+oPcCgAoAiubhLaPc3JPRfWmZVasaUbs p6PYHUr0tLzEh3Sc4znoPxpnl04OpK7OxpHeFABQAUAFABQAUAMmd44maOMyuBwgIGT9TQJtpaFD TfD9zd37XutKPlPyQ5BB+uP4R6d+/vzVa6taBwO8neR1FcYxk0fmwvHvdN6ldyHDDPcH1pp2dwPM L4TLezJcymWZHKO5YtkjjqfpXqRtZWMWQVQBQAUAehKyuoZSGUjIIPBFSeqZviKDztKcgMTGQ4A/ I/hgmmjGurwOb0tiLwKBncpH07/0oZlhJWqW7mvUnqhQAUAI6B0ZDnDAg4oFKPMmmc8QVJBBBHUG rPBatozq/DEjPphVjkJIVX2GAf5k0md2HfuGvSNwoApX2q2tgdszMZMBgirkkZx9P1oM51Iw3M+b xTCuPJtpH9d5C4/LNOxk8SuiKGqayupWXlmLymWRWA3bsjBz2+n50GVSrzxsXvAX/Iam/wCvdv8A 0JaZgHj3/kNQ/wDXuv8A6E1AGj4J/wCQRL/13P8A6CtUjWGx0NBZWl1CzgkMc13BG46q0gBH4UCu jkPFqWsl2l5aXEMvmDbIqSBiCOh6+nHTt70mZztuYFIg760lae0hlYAM8asQOmSKk9OLvFMloKI7 idLaB5pDhEGT7+31oFJqKuzi9LTddg5xtBP17f1ps5cJG9S/Y2Kk9UKAIrm4S2j3NyT0X1pmVWrG lG7M+0tbjV7sgHAH3nxwg/z2p7Hl+/WndnXWlpFZQLDCuFHU9yfU+9I7YxUVZE9BQUAFABQAUAFA BQAUASalrltpdzFDcxzASDIkVMqOcHv29vUV58KTmro89uxV1DxLZLpc01nco833I1wQ2498EdB1 6Y4xVQoS5kpITkrHG/2rqP8Az/3X/f5v8a7fZw7EXZXllknkMk0jyOerOck/jVJJaIQymAUAFAHd ad/yDbX/AK4p/IVJ6UPhRPJGssbRuMo4KsPUGgpq6szi9raXqu2TJET4bAGWU/4g/rVHAr0qnoa5 xnhgw7FTkH6VB7Sd1dCUAFABQBh3wUXkmzGM+vfv+tUjxsQkqrsdH4V/5Bsn/XY/yFDN8P8ACbNI 6BskixRtI5wiAsx9AKBN2V2cJeXLXl3JO/Bc5x6DsPyqjzZS5ncu2vh7VLnBW1aNd20mX5Me+Dzj 6CnYFFkmqeHptKsVuJ5o2ZpQgRASMYJzk49OmKLA42Re8Bf8hqb/AK92/wDQlpEh49/5DUP/AF7r /wChNQBo+Cf+QRL/ANdz/wCgrVI1hsdDQWefeKf+Rguv+Af+gCkzGW5k0iQoA7PQWZtHtyxJOCOT 2DECkz0KPwI0KRqc74ovvuWcbf7cmD+Q/r+VNHLiJ/ZRR0mIhHkIHzcA/wA/8+1Jm2ChZOTL0kiR Ludgo96R2SlGKvJlGbVFHEKEn1bpTscc8Yl8CDT7CfWLkySErCp+Z/8A2Uf5/wDrvY5kpV5c0jrY YY7eJYokCIowAKR2JJKyH0DCgAoAKAEZlRSzEKoGSScACgNjnb/xK24pYqNuCC7jnPqB/j+VOxyT xHSJmy6zqEyhWunABz8mFP5imYurN9SrNcTT486aSTb03sTj86CHJvdiRTSwMWhkeNiMZRiDigE2 tizd6rd31skF1IJRGQUdlG5eMYz3zxnPoKiNOMXdBcp1YgoAKACgAoAtaXaG8v4otu5M5fr90den 5fjQXTjzSSO5qT0goAxfEtgJrf7XGCZIhhsd1+ntnP500c9eF1zIxdMutjCB+jH5TnofShoeErWf IzUqT0QoAKAMEg3N0RECWkfCg8dTxVnhyfPNtdWdvZ2y2dpHAnIQYz6nufzqT0Ix5VYnoKMLxRe7 IUtEPMnzP/ug8fr/ACpo5sROy5Sv4T0o3l8LuQYht2B5B+Zu2D7cH8vWqRzRV3c7mmanPeNv+QRF /wBdx/6C1DInsZ3gL/kNTf8AXu3/AKEtSZB49/5DUP8A17r/AOhNQBo+Cf8AkES/9dz/AOgrVI1h sHifUJNMvtOuYxu2+YGXOAwO3I/z3xQwk7NHM6/cx3mrS3EJykiow9vkHB9xUszk7sz6BBQB2Xh/ /kDQf8C/9CNJnoUfgRo0jU4a8ka/1ORozvMsm1O2RnC/piqPNk+eehrwxLBEsaHIXv61J7NOHJFR QrosiFHAKnqKRUoqSszEvLY20u3JKnlTVI8evS9lK3QtaJqP9n3fznEMnEnGcehpipVOR67HYqyu oZSGUjIIPBFSegLQAUAFABQBI+kW17EovYi4ByF3sAPyPWuSpXd7QZy1ZKTsT/2Vp3/Pha/9+V/w rD2k+5jZFiKKOCMRwxpGi9FQYA/Cpbb1Yx9IDlPF+kWcMD6gjGKd3A2AfK5Oc/Q45z7eprrw9STf L0IklucjXYQFABQAUAFABQB0/ha0MdvJdMBmU7U45wOvPuf5UmdmHjZcxuUjpCgBsmzy283b5eDu 3dMd8+1Ana2pwVwsaTusL74gfkbnkduw5qjzJWT0NHTrwy/upDlgOG9f/r1LR6WGrufuS3L1I7CC 9m8m2ZsnJ+VcetNGNefJTbJfC9j9+8kX/YjyPzP9Pzps4cPD7TOipHUFAHE6xc/a9SmkBygO1fmy MDjj2PX8ao86rLmk2dp4Xtfs2iQZTa8uZG5znPQ/984qkVFaGtQUc942/wCQRF/13H/oLUMiexne Av8AkNTf9e7f+hLUmQePf+Q1D/17r/6E1AGj4J/5BEv/AF3P/oK1SNYbFTx3/wAuP/bT/wBlpMUz lKRmFABQB22jwPbaXBHIMMASR6ZJOPrzUno0k4wSZJqM/wBlsJ5g20qh2nGfm6D9cUDnLli2cjpS K10SwztUkfXp/WmzmwkVKpr0NepPWCgBk0KTxlHGQf0oInCM48sjDnhaCUowPHQ+o9as8apTdOXK zo/DN+00TWkjEtGMpn+70x+H9fakzpw87rlZuUjpCgAoA53xLezQ3lvFGQFjxMOM/Nk46/SnY5MR JppHT6HqqatYrLlFmXiVFP3T/gev/wCqvNq0+SVjJO5BbeJLO41WSxDADIWKXdlZD3Htz09fyzUq MlHmFzK9in4zv7i0htY7eV4vMZmZkYq3GOMjtz+gq8NBSbbCTMqz8YX8BAuVjuVyScja3ToCOP0r aWGi9tCVJlXxFrI1e6jMSukES4UPjOT1PH4d+1VRp+zWu4N3MmtiQoAnWxu3UMtrOykZBEZwRQVy S7C/2fe/8+lx/wB+z/hQPkl2JYNJvp5AgtpE9WkUqB+dA1Sm3axv6d4ft7Yb7kLPL7j5V46Y7/jS udUKCjvqa9I3CgDP1HWLawJRiZJgP9Wvb0ye3/1+lMynVjDTqctfajc375mfCjGEXhR+HrTOKdSU 9yKK2mm5jjYj16D86Bwozn8KLUWly5DNIqdxjkg0rnTDBz3bsaaBggDsGYdTjGak9GKaVmyheh7u 8itIcliffGT6/Qc1SODFS55qmjrLeBLaBIYxhEGB7+/1pGsUoqyJKBle+uRaWU0/GUXjIyM9v1xQ TOXLFs4SqPMPTtPkglsLd7XiAxgIM5wMdD7jpVG62LNAznfG7qNLhQsNxmBC55ICnP8AMfnQyJ7G f4C/5DU3/Xu3/oS1JkHj3/kNQ/8AXuv/AKE1AGj4J/5BEv8A13P/AKCtUjWGxU8d/wDLj/20/wDZ aTFM5SkZhQBo6HY/bb9d65ij+d8jg+g/H+WaDWjDmkdlUnoGfrys2j3AUEnAOAOwYZpoyrfAzmdJ /wCPlv8AcP8AMUMzwf8AEfoa1SemFABQBWvbQXKfKB5o+6ScZ9qaZz4iiqkbrcq6Fcm21SI87ZD5 bADrnp+uKpnm0Zcs0dnUnoBQAUAcz4ri23ME277yFcY6YOf/AGamjjxK1TMi3uprXzfJfb5sZjfg HKnqOaHFPc5iGmBavdRub8Qi5kL+SmxST156n36DPsKiMFG9ht3KtWIKACgAoA9AhiWCCOJSSqKF GeuAMVJ6iVlYfQMKACgAoA5rWdcnW4ltrVgiIdpcD5ie/wBP/rdadjkq1ndxiYccbyttjUsfamc8 Yyk7RRqW2momGmw7enapuejSwkY6z1ZdpHYFABQA3QYzNq91OwXEY2j1BJwCPwB/Oq6HnR96tKT6 HRUjcKAMzxFE8ulOUZhsIZgB94f4d/wpoxrpuGhx9M4C3Fql9Bai2hupY4g24BGxg/Xrj26UDuzV 8K6vBpsd4tzIwTaHRRzkjggD1OR+XPSmiouxl6rqUuq3puJQF42oo/hX09+tIlu5s+Av+Q1N/wBe 7f8AoS0CDx7/AMhqH/r3X/0JqALfhCfytJlUDJM5PP8AurRex00YcyuU/GMjSG0LH+/gen3aLhXi o2sc3Qcxs6b4eluMSXW6GLn5ejn8+gpXOinQctZaHTwwx28SxRIERRgAUjsSSVkPoGVtR/5Bt1/1 xf8AkaCJ/CzjbCUxXackBvlIHfP/ANfFNnJh5ctRG3UnsBQAUAFAGXqpCXqyRkq5UMSOPmz1H5A/ XNUjycVHkqaHYW0vn20U23b5iBsZzjIzSOuLukySgYUAZfiOBptLYrnMTB8AZyOh/nn8KaMa8bwO QpnAFABQAUAFABQBpaJpsl7dLIVHkRsC5YZB/wBn3pG1Km5O/Q7Gkd4UAFABQA2SRYo2kc4RAWY+ gFAm7K7OAkkaWRpHOWclmPqTVHmN3d2blrCILdExg4y31qT2aMOSCRLSNQoAKACgCXwuoaC4uD9+ SXBHbgZ/9mNUzzqHvXl3Zt0jcKAGTRLPBJExIV1KnHXBGKBNXVjgZI2ikaNxhkJVh6EVR5jVnZja BBQAUAdL4C/5DU3/AF7t/wChLQAePf8AkNQ/9e6/+hNQBL4V/wCQbJ/12P8AIUmduH+EPEVhc3v2 f7NHv2bt3zAYzj1+lCCvCUrWHaVoUdniW42yzg5XGdq/T1NFx06Kjq9zXpG4UAFABQBwN1A1rdSw NnKMRkjGR2P41R5ko8raN2Ni8aORt3KGx9RmoPbhLmipC0FBQAUAYuo/8fsn4fyFUjyMT/Ff9dDq fD//ACBoP+Bf+hGhnRR+BGjSNQoARlV1KsAykYII4IoA4/UdIuLe9kSC3leInKFEJGD279OlM4J0 pKWi0M2mYhQAUAKqs7BVBZicAAck0AbOmeH5pZVe8QxwgA7c8t7e3v8A5wrnRToNu8tjqFVUUKoC qBgADAApHbsLQAUAFABQBmeIp/J0pwCwMhCAj8z+GAaaMa7tA5GJ/LlR8Z2kHFM4oS5ZJ9joag90 KACgAoAKAL2hPH9lkiRAjRytuA4Jycg/lx+FM4o2TaXc0qCwoAKAOQ8RWzQam77QElAZcDjPQ/jn n8aaOCvG079zLpmIUAFAHS+Av+Q1N/17t/6EtAB49/5DUP8A17r/AOhNQBL4V/5Bsn/XY/yFJnbh /hNmkdAUAFABQAUAFAHKeJ7YxagJgDtmXqT3HB/TFNHFiI2lfuO01t1imEwFJXOfvHr/AFFJnbhJ Xp27FmkdQUAFAGDdEm6lySfnP86tHiVnepL1Ow0WJodJt1Ygkru49Ccj+dSdtJWgi9QaBQAUAFAE E9nbXOfPgjckbcleQPr1FBLhGW6M5vDNkzEh51BPQMMD9KdzL6vAT/hGLL/nrcf99D/Ci4vq8S/Z afbWK4gjAbGC55Y/j+FI1hTjDYtUFhQAUAFABQAUAV762F3ZTQYGXXAycDPb9cUEzjzRaOEqjzDo IGLwRsxySoJ/KoPcptuCb7D6CwoAKACgCOxuBaa4FZjsuFC47A9B9emPxquhwVHyV/U6SkahQAUA MmhjniaKVA6MMEGgTSaszktV0WXT8yofMt84Dd1+v+NM4alFw16GZTMQoA6XwF/yGpv+vdv/AEJa ADx7/wAhqH/r3X/0JqAJfCv/ACDZP+ux/kKTO3D/AAmzSOgKACgAoAKACgDE8VxqbKGQj5lk2g+x Bz/IU0c+JXupmNpD4lkTHUZz9P8A9dDHgpe80alSeiFABQBzrMXYsxyScmrPBbbd2dzp3/INtf8A rin8hUnow+FFmgsKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgCtcX9pa7hNcRqVxlc5b8hzQRKcY7szLjxPAjYggeUAk Esdo/Dr/AEp2MZYhLZFH/hJ73/nlb/8AfJ/xosZ/WJB/wk97/wA8rf8A75P+NFg+sSD/AISe9/55 W/8A3yf8aLB9YkH/AAk97/zyt/8Avk/40WD6xIyriY3E7zFVUudxC5xnv1pmEnd3NPS5la38rIDJ nj1HrUs9PCVE4cvVFykdYUAFABQBnar8ksMiEq4zhgeRjGKpHn41WcWtzp9NvFvrKOcY3EYcDs3e kXTnzxuWqCwoAKAEZVdSrAMpGCCOCKAMW78NRTztJDN5CtyU2ZAPtzwPanc55YdN3TsY2oaRc6dG skpjZGO3KHofxpnPOlKCuzW8Bf8AIam/692/9CWgyDx7/wAhqH/r3X/0JqAJfCv/ACDZP+ux/kKT O3D/AAmzSOgKACgAoAKACgDG8Vf8g2P/AK7D+Rpo58R8JiaQmZZHz0GMfX/9VDHgo+82alSeiFAE V0/l20jZI+U4I9e1NGdaXLTbMJVZ2CqCzE4AA5JqjxDv4YlggjiUkqihRnrgDFSeolZWH0DCgAoA KACgAoAKAILu7isoGmmbCjoO5PoPegmUlFXZyV9rF3eO2ZGjiOQI0OBg9j6/jVHDOrKRWhtZpyNi HB/iPAouEKM57Ivw6XGoBlYufQcCpud0MHFfFqTf2fa/88v/AB4/40XNPqtLt+Yf2fa/88v/AB4/ 40XD6rS7fmH9n2v/ADy/8eP+NFw+q0u35h/Z9r/zy/8AHj/jRcPqtLt+Yh0+2IIEZHuGPFFweFpd iD7DJbSiW2YsB1UnBI9KLmP1eVKXNTdy+rblDYIyM4PUUjtTuri0DCgAoAgvoDcW5VfvA5HvTRhi KbqQstzN07UJdOn8yPlTw6How/x96o8qE3B3R20M0c8SyxOHRhkEVJ6Kaauh9AwoAKACgDG8Vf8A INj/AOuw/kaaOfEfCReAv+Q1N/17t/6EtM4g8e/8hqH/AK91/wDQmoAl8K/8g2T/AK7H+QpM7cP8 Js0joCgAoAKACgAoAwPFc6iCG34LM2888gAY6e+T+VNHNiZaJGdpCkLK2OCQB/n8aGa4JOzZoVJ3 BQBT1STba7eMuQMe3X/CmjlxcrU7dyvocHn6rACGwh3kjtjkfhnFUefRV5o7SpPQCgAoAKACgAoA KAGTSrBBJKwJVFLEDrgCgTdlc4nUdQl1CfzJOFHCIOij/H3qjzpzc3dlyzsI0jV5V3ORnDdB+FS2 ejQw0VFOS1LtI6woAKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgDL1O22P5yA7W+9x0NUjzcXRs+dC6TqsmnS 4OXgY/On9R7/AM6Zz06jg/I6y0u4r2BZoWyp6juD6H3qTujJSV0T0FBQAUAY3ir/AJBsf/XYfyNN HPiPhIvAX/Iam/692/8AQlpnEHj3/kNQ/wDXuv8A6E1AEvhX/kGyf9dj/IUmduH+E2aR0BQAUAFA BQAUAcVrN2bzUZXyCiHYmDkYHfPvyfxqjzqsuaTLemxGO1GerndUs9PCwcaevXUtUjoCgDG1Kbzb kqCcJ8v49/8APtVI8nFT5qll0NjwtZsoku2yAw2IPUdz/L9aGVh4faOhpHUFABQAUAFABQAUAZ+v My6PcFSQcAcHsWANNGVb4GcpYQie5AbG1fmI9aGc2Hp89SzNupPYCgAoAKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgA oAKACgBHRZEKOAVPUUClFSVmYNxC1vMY25x0PqKs8WrTdOXKyWwv59PlMkBHIwytyD9aBQm4O6Ou 07UoNQiDRsFkx80ZPK//AFvepO+FRTWhcoLCgDG8Vf8AINj/AOuw/kaaOfEfCReAv+Q1N/17t/6E tM4g8e/8hqH/AK91/wDQmoAl8K/8g2T/AK7H+QpM7cP8Js0joCgAoAKACgDO1jVE0+AqpzO4+QDt /tH2/nTMqtRQXmcvYWxnm3EDYhBbnr6cfhQznw1L2k9dkbNSeuFAEdxL5MDycfKOM+vamRUnyQcj HtLd728jhUndI3JPb1NUeLFOcrHcW8CW0CQxjCIMD39/rUnpRSirIkoGFABQAUAIzKilmIVQMkk4 AFAbFSXVbCFQzXURGcfIdx/IUEOrBdStN4isI8bGklz/AHE6fninYh14IzNZ1qG/sxDAsyHeC24A Ajnjg+uKLGNWspxsjM099l5HkkA8fX/JoZOGly1UbdSewFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFAB QBDdWqXKgMSCvQimmY1qMaq1Mu4sZoMnG9B/Ev8AWnc86ph509d0V1ZkYMpKsDkEHBBpnPsbFh4j uIMJcjzoxxu6MOn5/wCeaVjohXa0lqbC6/pzKCZypI6FGyP0osdHt4dzN1/U7S8skjt5d7CQMRtI 4wfUe9CMa1SMo2TJvAX/ACGpv+vdv/QlpnKHj3/kNQ/9e6/+hNQBL4V/5Bsn/XY/yFJnbh/hNmkd AUAFABQBSv8AVLaxjcu6tKvAiDfMT/Qe9BnOpGCOQmlm1C9LsA0srAADgZ6AVRwNucr9WbccS28K QKQQg5I7t3P+ewFSz2KNP2cEhaRqFAGVqlwHcQr0Q8n1NUjzcXV5nyLobfhqwEFv9rcESSjC57L9 PfGfyoYUIWXMzapHQFAFG81ezswd8odwcbI/mOe/0/GgzlVjHqYt34luJCy2qLEvZmGW69fT+dOx zyxDfwmdJql9I5druYE/3WKj8hxTMXUm+pWAJIABJPQCghK+iJVtZ2YAQvn3GKLmqo1G7crH/wBn 3P8Azy/8eH+NK5f1Wr2/Ik/sqf8Avx/mf8KLmn1Op3Q5NNuI3Vw0WVIIyT/hRcccJUi000alSekF ABQAUAFABQAUAFABQBE9zBHndKgx1Gcn8qdjOVanHdkL6lbrjBZ/oOn50WMpYumttSH+1v8Aph/4 /wD/AFqdjH67/d/Ei/tWf+5H+R/xosZ/XKnZCjVZsjKRkd8A0WBY2fVIsRapE3Eisnv1FKxvDGQf xKxajmil/wBXIrHGcA80jpjUjL4WPoLKk+nQy8p+7b2HH5U7nNUwsJ6rQzpbOeJ9vls3uoJFO558 8PUi7WuQsrI21lKkdiMUzJpp2YlAjpfAX/Iam/692/8AQloAPHv/ACGof+vdf/QmoAl8K/8AINk/ 67H+QpM7cP8ACbNI6CKW6t4GCzTxRsRnDuAcUEuUVuzPvvEFpa5WI/aJPRD8v5/4Zp2M514x21MK 61y+ucDzfJA7RZX9etOxyyrTkUYonmkWONSzN0FBmk5OyNewsxaFZtxM+DyDwufT3xn8/wAals9K hhuX3pblmkdgUAQXtx9nhJH324X/ABpowr1fZxv1M/TLI6jfCJmIXlnbvj/9f86o8unF1JanbKqo oVQFUDAAGABUno7Gff61aWWV3ebKP4E7Hnqe3T6+1OxlOtGJz1/rV3e5Xd5UR/gTuOep79fp7U7H JOtKRSht5Z8+WhYDv2oFClOfwotx6VIwzJIqewGaVzpjgpP4nYtxafbx87S59W5pXOqGFpx6XLCI kYwiqo9AMUjeMVHRIWgYUARyzxQ/6x1X27/lTInUhD4mVJdVQZESFjzyeBRY5Z4yK+FFSS/uJMjf tB7KMf8A16djlliakutiL7TP/wA9pP8Avo0zP2tT+Z/eH2mf/ntJ/wB9GgPa1P5n95It9cqoAlOB 6gGlYtYiqla4o1C5BB8wH2Kiiw1iqvck/tWf+5H+R/xosafXKnZEv9rf9MP/AB//AOtRY0+u/wB3 8SB9SuGxgqmPQdfzosYyxdR7aFeSaWX78jMM5wTxTMJVJS+JiwW8tzII4I2dj2A6f4CglRcnZGlF 4bv5FJbyojnGHbn9M0rmyw82aEPhaFc+dcyP6bAFx+eaLmqwy6stR+H9ORArRM5H8TOcn8sCi5ao QXQJPD+nOhVYmjJ/iVzkfnkUXB0IdjLvPDM0YLWsglGfuN8px256H9KLmMsO18JkTQTWk2yVGjcc jPH4j/GmYNOL10NOxvRONkmBIP8Ax6paPTw+I9p7sty3SOoKAEZVddrKGB7EUCaTVmZ+pwRRwq6I qtuA4445qkcOLpwjFSSNPwF/yGpv+vdv/Qlpnnh49/5DUP8A17r/AOhNQBmWWsSWFg0ECjzGkLF2 GQBgDj3pG0KrhGyK02pXk5bzLmUhhgqGwCPoOKZDqSe7K1BAUAaMOi3Tx+bMBBHn+P7x+g/xxSub ww85+RoxRx20bRW4IjJyS33m9Mn+lI9OlRjTWgtI1CgAoAxtRm826YA5VPlH9apHk4qfNUt0RtWE 1podkPPcm5lAZ415Yegx24Pf3oLg40o67mfqGvXN4rRoBDEwwVXkke5/wx1osYzrSlpsinBYzzDI UKvYtxmi46eHqT1RoQadDFy/7xvccflSud9PCwhq9S3SOkKACgAoAbJIkS7nYKPegmUoxV5My7rU XlO2EsifqapI82tipS0hoi5YeHLifD3J8iPrt6sen5f54ouRCg3rLQ14PD9hDgmNpSDkGRv0wMDF FzdUIIvw28MGfJhjj3ddigZ/KkaqKWyJKBhQAUAVpNPs5d2+1hJfO47Bk59+uaCHCL3RTm8O2EmN iyRY/uP1/PNO5DoQYQ+HbCPO9ZJc/wB9+n5YouCoQRJ/YOm/8+3/AI+3+NFx+xh2LsNvDBnyYY49 3XYoGfypGiilsiSgYUAFABQAUAFAEVzbQ3cXlTxh0znB7GgmUVJWZy+p6DNZhpYSZoQCSe6j39fr 9elO5x1KLjqthllqAKiOdsEdGPf60NHVQxStyz+80Kk7goApat/x7L/vj+Rpo5MZ/DXqX/AX/Iam /wCvdv8A0Jao8sPHv/Iah/691/8AQmoA5qgBVVnYKqliewFA0m3ZF630t5ELyyCL0Xblj/gP19qV zqhhJy30NO3ihtB/o8YVv+ejfM/fv269gKVztp4eEBzMWOWJJ9SaRuJQAUAFAEVzMIIGfjI6D1NM zq1PZwcjBqjxC5a6e82HfKIeR6mlc6qOGlPWWiL8FjBAchSzdi3OKVzup4enDVFikbhQAUAFABQB Fc3CW0e5uSei+tMyq1Y0o3ZmRpc6pdLGnzN+QUev0p7HlylOtLU6jTtHtrAh1BkmA++3b1wO3/1+ tB1QpRhr1NCkahQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFAHM65ovk7rq0X931eMfw+4 9v5fTo0zjrUbe9Ez7PUGi2xy8xjjPcf/AFqGi6GJcLRlsawIIBBBB6EVJ6ad9UUtW/49l/3x/I00 cmM/hr1L/gL/AJDU3/Xu3/oS1R5YePf+Q1D/ANe6/wDoTUAY9hZJcKZHY4BxtHfpSbOzD4eNRc0j TihjhXEaBR/OpPQhTjBWih9BYUAFABQAUAFAFe7tnudqbwiDk8ZJNNHPWpSq2V7IIrGCIqwUll6E mi44YanCzS1LFI3CgAoAKACgAoAjuJlt4TI3OOg9TTM6tRU48zMdRNqF2iDmSQ4HoP8A6wqjyJSl Vnrudjp2nxadB5cfLHl3I5Y/4e1Sd0IKCsi3QWFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFAB QAUAFABQBzGvaOtuGu7YARZ+dP7pPce3t/kNHHWpcvvIqaZdYIgcgD+E+/pQ0bYStb92/kS6t/x7 L/vj+RpI1xn8Nepf8Bf8hqb/AK92/wDQlqjyw8e/8hqH/r3X/wBCagChpP8Ax7N/vn+QqWepg/4b 9S7SOsKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgAoAKACgDJ1SfzJhEp+VOv1/z/AFqkeZi6nNLlWyL/AIWt BJcSXTA4iG1OOMnrz7D+dDIw8bvmOnpHYFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAFABQAUAF ABQAUAIyq6lWAZSMEEcEUAcfrmmrp90vlZ8mQErnse4/l+dNHBWp8j02Ibi6+0WShyPMVxn3GDzR Y1qVvaUknvc2fAX/ACGpv+vdv/QlpnIHj3/kNQ/9e6/+hNQBi2l99miKeXuyc53YpNHVRxHso2tc n/tb/ph/4/8A/WosbfXf7v4h/a3/AEw/8f8A/rUWD67/AHfxD+1v+mH/AI//APWosH13+7+If2t/ 0w/8f/8ArUWD67/d/EP7W/6Yf+P/AP1qLB9d/u/iH9rf9MP/AB//AOtRYPrv938Q/tb/AKYf+P8A /wBaiwfXf7v4h/a3/TD/AMf/APrUWD67/d/EP7W/6Yf+P/8A1qLB9d/u/iH9rf8ATD/x/wD+tRYP rv8Ad/EP7W/6Yf8Aj/8A9aiwfXf7v4h/a3/TD/x//wCtRYPrv938Q/tb/ph/4/8A/WosH13+7+If 2t/0w/8AH/8A61Fg+u/3fxD+1v8Aph/4/wD/AFqLB9d/u/iUfMVpmklQtk5IBxTOLmTlzSRsweIo raMRwaesaDsJOv6cmlY2VdRVlEk/4Sr/AKc//Iv/ANaixX1nyD/hKv8Apz/8i/8A1qLB9Z8g/wCE q/6c/wDyL/8AWosH1nyD/hKv+nP/AMi//WosH1nyD/hKv+nP/wAi/wD1qLB9Z8g/4Sr/AKc//Iv/ ANaiwfWfIP8AhKv+nP8A8i//AFqLB9Z8g/4Sr/pz/wDIv/1qLB9Z8g/4Sr/pz/8AIv8A9aiwfWfI P+Eq/wCnP/yL/wDWosH1nyD/AISr/pz/APIv/wBaiwfWfIP+Eq/6c/8AyL/9aiwfWfIP+Eq/6c// ACL/APWosH1nyD/hKv8Apz/8i/8A1qLB9Z8g/wCEq/6c/wDyL/8AWosH1nyD/hKv+nP/AMi//Wos H1nyD/hKv+nP/wAi/wD1qLB9Z8g/4Sr/AKc//Iv/ANaiwfWfIP8AhKv+nP8A8i//AFqLB9Z8g/4S r/pz/wDIv/1qLB9Z8g/4Sr/pz/8AIv8A9aiwfWfIP+Eq/wCnP/yL/wDWosH1nyD/AISr/pz/APIv /wBaiwfWfIq6lri6haGFrXYchlbzM4P0x6ZosZ1K3OrWMimYHS+Av+Q1N/17t/6EtAG9r/hj+2r1 Lj7X5O2MJt8vdnBJz1HrQBm/8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBl QAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8 ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1 Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8A yB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9 lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf 8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ ANRL/wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL /wAgf/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAg f/ZUAH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQAf8ID/1Ev8AyB/9lQAf8ID/ANRL/wAgf/ZU AH/CA/8AUS/8gf8A2VAB/wAID/1Ev/IH/wBlQBpaB4Y/sW9e4+1+dujKbfL245Bz1PpQB//Z ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CA9D0F.B5E626B0 Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://www.hostik.com/webhosting.gif R0lGODlhFAAUAPcAAPzU1P/5+f7v7/3n5//8/PzX1/zV1fvNzfzf3/7x8f/+/vvHx/vJyf7s7PvM zPzT0//7+/vCwvvQ0PvLy/vR0f7t7fmwsPzc3PJTU/3i4v7n5/mxsfza2v/9/fNXV/mqqv3p6f/4 +P3Z2filpfvIyPzY2PzZ2fA6OvrAwPrBwf3m5vzW1v3s7PvKyv/6+v3f3/Z9ffNfX/7m5vNcXPFK Svm4uOwHB/aCgvzOzvvDw/vBwfvS0vE/P/AyMvq5ufVxcfrGxvvExP719fipqf3d3fNYWPmpqfq4 uPm6uveVlfq6uvvGxvJOTveamvJUVPFDQ/FISPNdXf7w8OwAAPisrP/19f7y8vq8vO0YGPihofNW Vvibm/V4ePmlpf74+Pqtrf75+fvPz/3c3Pq+vvA3N/zR0fiiovJXV/vU1PvAwPmiouwREfienvRt bfidnfRqav3j4+4bG/7p6e0NDe4dHf3t7fzLy/E4OPeXl/rDw/zb2/aBgfiZmfBAQPm5uf3g4P70 9PArK/moqP729vV7e+4iIvu/v/A1NfVtbe4hIf/29vu6uvA5OfA0NOwODu0ODvm2tvq3t/3l5f// /wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAAAAAALAAAAAAUABQA AAj/ACcJHEiwoMGDCBMO7DCAhcKBATiUkBIEARoKAgDAQRgiBZE/ZuoI+nDgy4AdBwq6UDFBg4IA XRq04WKCQQACFESAEJgABYMsAQqMmPHjDg8njRCREDGkBQkwLQZMKlNCIJI8Nqa82SJnUgoBkwBc mBBikoAxAjes8BDlg4FJgJR0mDSAg563kww1mHQFBZkzVBCEfTCJwIIKk8KsmKQiwiQxbOgU4kNA UQ0vARa8GFhAwiQHb5PECeRnUhoNQuzIKJgBgAAdGXI8esLCwQMQPi4cPIDBQQQDjAg9YLAAwxFJ BiH0UFNFwoYYeyIVUODmhAKDg7CcwDEJgYVFCSYtLjmUyMXBEY6YNLEABAAkPHPWGElY4IYHLUWg 9KEBw8TDSRAk0EAFVhDw34ECBQQAOw== ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01CA9D0F.B5E626B0--